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ANTITRUST BALANCING IN A (NEAR)
COASEAN WORLD: THE CASE OF FRANCIDSE
TYING CONTRACTS
Alan J. Meese*

Antitrust law has largely succumbed to the hegemony of balancing.
Courts applying the rule of :~;eason are told to balance a restraint's
procompetitive effects against its anticompetitive impact.1 Mergers once
deemed anticompetitive solely because they facilitated the exercise of
market power are now evaluated by weighing the anticompetitive effects of such increased power against any efficiencies created by the
transaction.2 Finally, some activities once deemed per se illegal are now
subject to a balancing approach, either by explicit application of the
rule of reason,3 or by recognition of certain affirmative defenses to oth-
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Thomas Arthur, Ash Bhagwat, Curtis Bradley, Richard Craswell, Neal Devins, Jay
Hamilton, Trotter Hardy, Charles Koch, Jr., Thomas Krattenmaker, Robert Lande, Eugene Scalia, and Elmer Schaefer provided helpful comments. Gretchen Asher and Sarah
Crotty provided word processing assistance.
1. Courts apply the rule of reason to restraints not deemed per se illegal. For the
classic statement of the rule, see Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,
238-39 (1918) (holding that a court must consider all relevant factors in determining
whether contract merely "regulates" or instead "destroys" competition); see also Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 n.27 (1977); Capital Imaging
Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Medical Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
510 u.s. 947 (1993).
2. Compare United States v. Philadelphia Natl. Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963)
and U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES § 10 (1968) with FTC V. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222-24 (11th Cir. 1991) and American Medical Inti.,
Inc., 104 F.T.C. 1, 218-19 (1984) and HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4 (1992)
[hereinafter HoRIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES]. See generally Oliver E. Williamson,
Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. EcoN. REv. 18
(1968) [hereinafter Williamson, Welfare Tradeoffs]. Indeed at one time, the presence of
significant efficiencies apparently militated against a merger. See Timothy J. Muris, The
Efficiency Defense Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 381,
402-07 (1980).
3. Compare Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing
Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985) (group boycott analyzed under rule of reason) and Continental T. V., 433 U.S. at 49 (exclusive territory analyzed under rule of reason) and Rothery
Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (horizontal
ancillary restraint analyzed under rule of reason) and Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985) (same) with United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S.
111
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erwise per se violations. 4
Unlike many other balancing tests, the balancing framework familiar to antitrust scholars and practitioners is at least theoretically objective, if sometimes difficult to apply in practice.5 Drawing on neoclassical microeconomic analysis, this approach seeks to identify those
instances in which anticompetitive effects - higher prices and distortions in the allocation of resources - caused by a restraint outweigh
their procompetitive benefits, usually efficiencies in producing a product or service.6 While there is some dispute as to exactly which effects
should count against a restraint - whether, for instance, transfers of
wealth from consumers to producers should be deemed an anticompetitive effect7 - the theoretical economic framework within which these
effects are quantified and compared is invariate, and comprise what one
scholar calls a "basic partial equilibrium welfare economics model. " 8
The law of tying has been a moderately fertile source of such balancing litigation, particularly in the per se context, where judges and
scholars have identified several possible procompetitive justifications

596 (1972) (horizontal ancillary restraint per se illegal) and United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (exclusive territories per se unlawful), overruled
by Continental T. V., 433 U.S. at 36 and Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359

U.S. 207 (1959) (group boycott per se illegal).
4. See, e.g., Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am. Inc., 833 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.
1987) (entertaining and sustaining an affirmative defense); Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v.
Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1987) (entertaining, but rejecting, an affirmative defense); cf. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Per Se Violations in Antitrust Law: Confusing Offenses with Defenses, 77 GEO. L.J. 165 (1988) (arguing that no
contract is per se illegal, but that per se rules instead preclude the assertion of certain
justifications for otherwise illegal conduct).
5. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, What's So Special About Judges?, 61 U. CoLO. L.
REv. 773, 779-82 (1990) (decrying the proliferation of multi-factor balancing tests);
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989)
(same).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 61-66.
7. Compare ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTrrRUST PARADOX 110-13 (1993) (arguing that antitrust law should only be concerned with allocational, as opposed to distributional, effects of a restraint) with Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and
Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS
L.J. 65 (1982) (arguing that the primary objective of antitrust law is distributive in
nature).
8. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
369 (1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS]; Williamson, Wel·
fare Tradeoffs, supra note 2, at 20; see also BoRK, supra note 7, at 107; Thomas C. Ar·
thur, The Costly Quest for Perfect Competition: Kodak and Nonstructural Market
Power, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 15 (1994) (applying "Oliver Williamson's famous tradeoff
model" in the tying context); Lande, supra note 7, at 143 (employing identical models
to illustrate approaches premised upon differing definitions of consumer welfare).
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for otherwise per se illegal arrangements.9 This article focuses on one
such defense, the "franchise goodwill" justification. As courts and
others have recognized, a franchise tying contract - that is, a franchise
contract that requires a franchisee to purchase inputs from a franchisor
as a condition of receiving a franchise - can reduce the agency costs
that result from the division of labor that characterizes the relationship
between franchisor and franchisee. More precisely, such a requirement
can prevent a certain class of opportunistic behavior by franchisees,
namely, the failure to provide a product of a quality sufficient to mairitain the reputational value of the franchise trademark, while free riding
on the quality control efforts of others. 10 Thus, for example, a requirement by a fast food franchisor that its franchisees purchase its food ingredients or paper products might be justified as an attempt to ensure
that franchisees do not "skimp" on quality and dilute the reputation of
the franchise trademark. 11
Under current law, once a plaintiff establishes the elements of a
per se tying violation, the procompetitive benefits of a reduction in opportunistic behavior must be weighed against the anticompetitive effects
of the tie, which presumably has been "forced" on the purchaser by the
exercise of market power. 12 This weighing usually is not explicit, but instead takes the form of a less restrictive alternative analysis under
which the justification will fail when a less restrictive means of achieving the objective is available, even when the benefits of the tie outweigh any anticompetitive effects. 13
This article challenges the conventional analysis as applied to
franchise tying contracts and questions its application in areas outside
the franchise context as well. While consistent with the partial equilibrium welfare analysis employed in antitrust law generally, this conven9. See, e.g., Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 514 n.9
(1969) (White, J., dissenting) (discussing various procompetitive justifications); RicHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, .ANTrrn.UST 809-10 (2d ed. 1981) (evasion of cartel); Roy W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Block Booking,
26 J.L. & EcoN. 497 (1983) (tying can reduce overinvestment in search).
10. See Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1348-49
(9th Cir. 1987); see also Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 50-52 (9th Cir.
1971); Benjamin Klein & Lester F. Saft, The Law and Economics Of Franchise Tying
Contracts, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 345 (1985); cf. WILLIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS,
supra note 8, at 39 (discussing incentives for franchisees to free ride); Paul H. Rubin,
The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & EcoN.
223, 228 (1978) (same).
11. See, e.g., Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549
F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977); Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 50-52; Little Caesar Enters. v.
Smith, 895 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 19, 23-27.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 46-50.
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tional analysis is premised on an outdated preoccupation with monopolistic explanations for nonstandard contracts and misconceives the
relationship between market power, on the one hand, and tying contracts that serve a procompetitive objective, on the other. In particular,
this article demonstrates that a tying contract that reduces agency costs
and enhances franchise goodwill by eliminating opportunistic free riding by franchisees is not "forced" on purchasers nor is it otherwise the
result of market power. Instead, a contract that produces these benefits
is presumably the result of a purely voluntary arrangement that divides
between the parties those gains resulting from partial integration, integration that would occur regardless of whether the franchisor possessed
market power.
Given the low transaction costs inherent in the franchisorfranchisee relationship, no rational franchisor with market power would
use that power to impose such a tying requirement. Instead, the parties
would negotiate for the term, and the franchisor would exercise its
power simply by raising the price of the tying product: here, the
franchise opportunity itself. Denomination of the benefits created by
such a term as a "justification" or an "affirmative defense," then, improperly equates franchise tying contracts with other, presumptively anticompetitive, arrangements. Unlike the ordinary rule of reason or
merger analysis, where the presence of market power suggests that
procompetitive benefits coexist with anticompetitive effects, proof of
procompetitive effects in the franchise context suggests that no legally
cognizable anticompetitive effects are present. Thus, the partial equilibrium welfare analysis employed in other antitrust contexts and premised
necessarily upon the presence of high transaction costs is ill-suited for
the evaluation of tying contracts that produce these procompetitive effects, and, in fact, is unduly biased against such contracts.
The bias inherent in such a partial equilibrium analysis does more
than lead to incorrect results. It leads to less efficient methods of controlling free riding and encourages forward integration by franchisors,
integration that both destroys efficiencies otherwise realizable via the
division of labor inherent in the franchise system and retards the growth
of independent small business. In order to eliminate this bias, courts
ought to alter the current framework by holding that a franchisor establishes the prima facie legality of a tying contract by proving that it
eliminates free riding. Such an approach will not only ensure correct results; it will truncate the full-blown analysis undertaken when evaluating tying contracts, thus reducing litigation costs.
The conclusion offered here has implications beyond the franchise
context, premised, as it is, on the inapplicability of a partial equilibrium
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welfare analysis in low transaction cost settings. When the contract
under scrutiny arises in such a setting, a 'Conventional partial equilibrium analysis is ill-suited for a proper evaluation of the restraint.

J.

BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]ying agreements serve
hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition." 14 Yet, the
Justices have never held that all contracts that condition the sale of one
product upon the purchase of another are illegal. Instead, the Court has
developed an elaborate analytical framework, best articulated in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 15 for identifying tying contracts that are the result of anticompetitive "forcing," that is, are imposed through the exercise of market power. 16 Under this approach, a
plaintiff may make out a per se violation by proving: (1) the existence
of separate products; (2) conditioning the sale of one (tying) product on
the purchase of another (tied) product; (3) the seller's possession of
power in the market for the tying product; and (4) substantial commerce
in the tied product. 17 Proof of these four elements gives rise to a pre14. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958) (quoting Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949)).
15. 466 u.s. 2 (1984).
16. See 466 U.S. at 12-15; Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S.
495, 503-04 (1969). As explained below, there are "nonforcing" theories that explain
how ties can, in some circumstances, have anticompetitive effects. The rationale of the
per se rule, however, focuses on the threat of forcing. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at
12 ("Our cases have concluded that the essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product to force
the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, or
might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms. When such 'forcing' is
present, competition on the merits in the market for the tied item is restrained and the
Sherman Act is violated.") (emphasis added); Little Caesar Enters. v. Smith, 895 F.
Supp. 884, 895 (B.D. Mich. 1995) (forcing constitutes a necessary element in franchise
tying case); Paul E. Volpp Tractor Parts, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1208,
1231-33 (W.D. Tenn. 1995) (same).
17. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62
(1992); Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15-18. It should be noted that courts do not always deem a franchise opportunity - the ability to operate under the franchise trademark - to be a separate, tying product. Instead, courts generally !md the trademark to
be a separate product only in those circumstances in which a so-called "business format
franchising" is involved, that is, where the franchisee produces the franchise product,
and distributes it under the franchise trademark. If, by contrast, the franchisor is the ultimate source of the product, such that the trademark merely identifies the supplier,
courts will not deem the trademark or the opportunity a separate, tying product. See
Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 704-05 (7th Cir. 1984)
(explaining this distinction). However, where the franchise is of the latter, "source" variety, courts often treat the franchise product itself as a separate, tying product. See, e.g.,
Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 478-81 (3d
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sumption that the challenged arrangement is an illegal tie, that is to say,
that the seller is using its market power over the tying product to
"force" a buyer to purchase the tied product, and that the arrangement
is, on balance, anticompetitive. 18 Despite the "per se" label, however,
this presumption is not conclusive. Some lower courts, at least, still admit the possibility of an "affirmative defense," in which a defendant
endeavors to show that the arrangement is necessary to advance a
procompetitive objective that outweighs the tie's anticompetitive
effects. 19
When a plaintiff is unable to establish the elements of a per se violation, courts analyze the arrangement under the rule of reason.20 Under
this approach, the plaintiff cannot rely upon the type of presumption
present in the per se context, but instead must prove directly that the tie
produces anticompetitive effects that outweigh its justiflcations.21 Of
course, the same procompetitive benefits that might be proffered as jus-

Cir. 1992) (en bane) (treating Chrysler automobiles as the tying product); Grappone,
Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 797-98 (1st Cir. 1988) (treating
Subaru automobiles as the tying product).
Most lower courts also require a showing that the seller has an "economic interest" in the sale of the tied product. See, e.g., Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc.,
934 F.2d 1566, 1578-79 (11th Cir. 1991). In addition, at least one circuit may require a
finding of an anticompetitive effect in the market for the tied product. See A.O. Smith
Corp. v. Lewis, Overbeck & Furman, 979 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1992).
18. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 13-15.
19. See Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342, 1348-1350
(9th Cir. 1987); Metrix Warehouse, Inc., v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d
1033, 1040-42 (4th Cir. 1987) (entertaining but ultimately rejecting a defense); United
States v. Jerrold Electronics. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (B.D. Pa. 1960), affd., 365 U.S.
567 (1961) (per curiam); see also Little Caesar Enters., 895 F. Supp. at 888 (noting
franchisees' failure to challenge the tie of proprietary items produced under a secret
formula). The Supreme Court has never approved the assertion of an affirmative defense to a tying contract. In Jerrold Electronics, the government did not challenge in the
Supreme Court the district court's fmding that the tie was necessary to the development
of a new product. See Jerrold Electronics, 365 U.S. at 567. Thus, the Court only affirmed that portion of the District Court's decision holding that the tie was no longer
justified once the defendant had established itself in the new market. See 365 U.S. at
567. Moreover, the Court has asserted that most, if not all, procompetitive purposes
could be served by means "less restrictive" than a tie. See sources cited infra note 60.
20. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 29-31; Town Sound, 959 F.2d at 482-83
(holding that, absent a showing of market power, courts will analyze a tie under the rule
of reason); Grappone, 858 F.2d at 796-98 (opinion of Breyer, J.) (reaching the same
Uniq Digital Technologies, Inc., 73 F.3d
conclusion). But see Digital Equip. Corp.
756, 761 (7th Cir. 1996) (opinion of Easterbrook, J.) (holding that market power is necessary to prove a violation under the rule of reason).
21. See Grappone, 858 F.2d at 799 (citing Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 31).

v.
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tifications for a per se violation are a1so relevant when such ba1ancing
occurs.22
It is against this backdrop that some lower courts have long entertained what might be called a "franchise goodwill" defense- an assertion that the tie ensures that franchisees use inputs of a qua1ity sufficient to maintain the image of the franchise, which is usua1ly associated
with a trademark.23 For instance, in Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 24 the
Ninth Circuit entertained, but rejected, Chicken Delight's assertion that
a requirement that its franchisees purchase from it cooking equipment,
food ingredients, and paper products was on ba1ance procompetitive because it ensured that its trademark was associated with a certain level of
quality.25 However, in Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America,
Inc.,26 the court, assuming arguendo that the plaintiff had established
the elements of per se liability, found Mercedes's requirement that its
dea1ers use only Mercedes or Mercedes-approved replacement parts justified by goodwill concerns, particularly in light of the jury's finding
that no less restrictive a1temative adequately advanced Mercedes's interest in qua1ity controi.27
Economists have formalized this franchise goodwill defense, demonstrating that, in some cases, such contractua1 requirements are a response to the agency costs created by the division of labor that characterizes the franchisor-franchisee relationship. By separating the
ownership of a trademark from its control, the franchise system a1lows
a division of labor that creates substantia] efficiencies.28 These efficien22. See, e.g., Grappone, 858 F.2d at 799-800 (relying in part on Jerrold Electronics for the conclusion that the tie helped the defendant break into a new market).
23. See, e.g., Moztlrt Co., 833 F.2d at 1348-51; Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d at
1040-41; see also Midwestern Waffles Inc., v. Waffle House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705, 713
(11th Cir. 1984).
24. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971).
25. 448 F.2d at 51.
26. 833 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987).
27. See 833 F.2d at 1349. But see Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d at 1040-42 (finding
the same arrangement illegal given the presence of a less restrictive alternative). Moztlrt
Co. and Metrix Warehouse are compared in J. Brady Dugan, Note, Contrasting Approaches to Economic Justifications in Tying Arrangement Analysis: Metrix. Warehouse
v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft and Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North
America, 12 GEO. MAsoN U. L. REv. 139 (1989).
28. Scholars have identified several efficiencies created by the franchise system.
See, e.g., James A. Brickley & Frederick H. Dark, The Choice of Organizational Form:
The Case of Franchising, 18 J. FIN. EcoN. 401 (1987) (stating that franchising leaves
the control of operations in the hands of the party who better internalizes the benefits of
its actions, the franchisee); Richard E. Caves & William F. Murphy IT, Franchising:
Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets, 42 S. EcoN. J. 572, 574-75 (1976) (noting that
franchising allows parties to realize the benefits of differing economies in the production of a service and the production of a national brand name); Klein & Saft, supra note
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cies, however, come with a price. In relinquishing its control over the
trademark, the franchisor leaves the quality of the products distributed
under the mark in the hands of individual franchisees. Under these conditions, the reputation associated with the franchise trademark assumes
the characteristics of a collective good, as no franchisee can exclude
other franchisees from the benefits that flow from its own maintenance
of high quality standards.29
In such circumstances, individual franchisees will face insufficient
incentives to produce quality products that maintain the trademark's
reputation.30 The benefits from any one franchisee's investment in quality will flow in large part to other franchisees. Concomitantly, each individual franchisee will recognize that it will enjoy the benefits of such
investment by other franchisees. Each franchisee will thus fmd it rational to engage in opportunistic behavior at the expense of the
franchise system- behavior that involves the sort of "free riding" that
usually characterizes the production of collective goods. 31 This free riding will consist of attempts to "cheat" customers, by providing them
with products inferior to those ordinarily associated with the trademark,
presumably at the same price charged by those fellow franchisees who
maintain a higher level of quality.32 While this behavior might breach
10, at 350 n.20 (agreeing with Caves and Murphy); Rubin, supra note 10, at 226-30
(noting that franchising facilitates the efficient policing of franchisee investments in
quality); see also Patrick J. Kaufmann & Francine LaFontaine, Costs of Control: The
Source of Economic Rents for McDonald's Franchisees, 37 J.L. & EcoN. 417, 429
(1994) ("[E]vidence in the literature suggest[s] that costs are higher in company-owned
than in franchised outlets of the same chain.").
29. See Rubin, supra note 10, at 228; see also MANcUR OLSON, THE LoGic OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION 14-16 (1965) (defming collective goods).
30. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10; G. Frank Mathewson & Ralph A. Winter,
The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 503, 504-05 (1985).
31. See Wn..LIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 39 (explaining
generally the incentives of franchisees to free ride); Rubin, supra note 10, at 228.
32. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 349-50; Mathewson & Wmter, supra note
30, at 506-08; Rubin, supra note 10, at 228. Put another way, the ordinary franchise arrangement is characterized by negative externalities - externalities that can be imposed
by one franchisee on its fellows via a suboptimal investment in quality. As Professor
Rubin explains:
What is involved is a classic externality problem. If any one franchisee allows
quality to deteriorate, he will generate revenue because consumers perceive him
as being of the same quality as other stores with the same trademark. Thus, if one
franchisee allows the quality of his establishment to deteriorate, he benefits by
the full amount of the savings from reduced quality maintenance; he loses only
part of the costs, for part is borne by other franchisees. All franchisees would
lose something as a result of this deterioration in one franchise: consumers would
have less faith in the quality promised by the trademark.
Rubin, supra note 10, at 228; see also Mathewson & Wmter, supra note 30, at 506-10
(discussing the "horizontal externality" problem).
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the franchise contract,33 detection and punishment of such deviancy may
well be prohibitively expensive.34 By ensuring that franchisees purchase
inputs of a certain quality, then, tying contracts can prevent a deterioration in the reputation of the franchise product and trademark.
Market mechanisms - for example, customer exit - often will
not deter such conduct. This is especially the case when customers
make one-time purchases and cannot readily observe quality beforehand.35 Such customers are unable to protect themselves, and franchisees have little incentive to maintain individual, franchise-specific reputations for quality.36 Thus, one commentator reports that, for many
years, Standard Oil Company owned all service stations operating under
its trademark along interstate highways, where few patrons are repeat
customers, but allowed owner-operated franchise stations in neighborhoods where repeat trade was prevalent.37 Presumably, the lack of repeat business along highways sharply reduced franchisees' incentives to
maintain quality. Such complete vertical integration is a drastic remedy,
which eliminates the gains inherent in the franchise system.38 Yet, ab-

33. Even if such conduct does not violate the explicit terms of the franchise agreement, it may well violate an explicit or implicit "best efforts" term. See Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089,
llh-30 (1981).
34. See Tunothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65
MINN. L. REv. 521, 523, 575-80 (1981) (arguing that shirking by franchisees is a paradigmatic example of opportunistic behavior).
35. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 350-51.
36. See Rubin, supra note 10, at 228.
37. See Keith K. Wollenberg, Note, An Economic Analysis of 1ie-In Sales: Reexamining the Leverage Theory, 39 STAN. L. REv. 737, 754-55 n.114 (1987); see also
Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 348 n.15 ("Chicken Delight appears to have assured
high-quality supply by granting franchisees fairly large exclusive territories and locating
their outlets off the main highways."). All customers need not be repeat customers for
such a strategy to be successful. Instead, so long as a franchisee cannot distinguish between repeat and one-time customers and discriminate against the latter, the presence of
a significant proportion of repeat customers should induce the appropriate investment in
quality. See Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d
468, 489 (3d Cir. 1992) (en bane); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in
Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U.
PA. L. REv. 630, 637-39 (1979) (explaining how, absent discrimination, the presence of
some knowledgeable consumers in a market can prevent sellers from exploiting those
consumers that are not well-informed).
38. See supra note 28; cf. Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S.
36, 57 n.26 (1977) (holding that courts should not, under guise of protecting distributors, adopt rules that encourage manufacturers to integrate forward); Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 337 U.S. 293, 319-21 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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sent this or some other method of control, competition between
franchise systems will suffer and output will fall. 39
Such shirking may even extend to the refusal by franchisees to
provide an optimal level of goods or services ancillary to the "primary"
product, either at the point of sale or in the aftennarkets.40 In Grappone,
Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 41 for instance, the court scrutinized
an agreement that conditioned the right to sell Subaru automobiles on
the dealer's agreement also to purchase a minimum number of spare
parts. This arrangement may well have prevented dealers from free riding on the provision of parts and service by others.42 Similarly, in
Yentsch v. Texaco, 43 the court evaluated Texaco's requirement that its
dealers maintain clean washrooms and provide S&H Greenstamps and
free glassware to customers who purchased a minimum amount of gasoline.44 Such requirements were likely designed to present a unifonn
bundle of services to the public, and to prevent individual franchisees
from luring consumers to nonconforming stations under the false expectation that such services would be available.
Not all tying contracts produce such procompetitive benefits; often
conditions are not conducive to free riding by franchisees, thereby suggesting an ulterior purpose for these contracts.45 However, even when a
franchisor can demonstrate that a tying contract prevents free riding,
current law rejects attempts to justify the agreement on this basis.
Under current law, a demonstration that such a contract prevents opportunistic behavior does not render the challenged arrangement legal. In39. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 349-51 (arguing that free riding results in
lower demand for franchise products); cf. Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers
Want Fair Trade?, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 86 (1960). Of course, the free riding attributed to
franchisees in this context differs from that ordinarily encountered in the vertical context In the latter case, customers are in a real sense in complicity with the distributor
who provides inferior service. In the former, the customer is a victim. See Klein & Saft,
supra note 10, at 351.
40. See Rubin, supra note 10, at 228 (arguing that free riding extends to franchise
relationship generally); see also note 17, supra (describing the so-called "source"
franchises, pursuant to which the franchisee distributes a product manufactured by the
franchisor).
41. 858 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1988).
42. See also Southern Pines Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 826 F.2d
1360 (4th Cir. 1987) (addressing a requirement that dealers carry a full line of automobiles); cj. Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at 55 (noting that exclusive territories can facilitate
aftermarket service); Kevin J. Arquit, Resale Price Maintenance: Consumers' Friend or
Foe?, 60 .ANrrmusT LJ. 447, 453 (1992) (concluding that resale price maintenance
can assure optimal service in aftermarkets).
43. 630 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1980).
44. See 630 F.2d at 49-50.
45. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 357-58 (suggesting that Chicken Delight
utilized tying contracts to collect rents appropriated by price discriminating franchisees).
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stead, the franchisor must prove that the benefits of the tie outweigh the
anticompetitive effects that are presumed to exist once a per se ,violation
has been "established." 46 Courts do not engage in this balancing explicitly, but instead scrutinize such an assertion by means of a less restrictive alternative test.47 This test requires courts to reject any asserted justification for a tie, including a "franchise goodwill" justification, when
the procompetitive objectives of the contract could be achieved through
less restrictive means. 48 In Chicken Delight, for instance, the court rejected a "goodwill defense," fmding that the defendant could have
specified in the franchise contract the attributes of the inputs in question.49 Conversely, when a tie is the least restrictive means of achieving
its objectives, for example, when it is impossible to specify all the attributes of the input(s) in question, or when those inputs are produced
pursuant to a trade secret, courts uniformly sustain the defense.50
The hostility toward procompetitive justifications exhibited by the
shifted burden of proof and the less restrictive alternative test flows naturally from the economic theory of ties adopted by the Supreme Court,
as well as the economic assumptions governing balancing approaches in
antitrust law generally. In Standard Oil, on which lower courts often
rely for the application of the less restrictive alternative test,51 the Court
discussed a different affirmative defense - the so-called "false attribu-

46. See supra note 19.
47. See, e.g., Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 833 F.2d 1342, 1348-49
(9th Cir. 1987); Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d
1033, 1040-42 (4th Cir. 1987); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 51 (9th Cir.
1971).
48. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1947) (rejecting the assertion
that a tie eliminated "false attribution problem" given the purported availability of less
restrictive alternative); Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d at 1040-42; Midwestern Waffles,
Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705, 712-13 (11th Cir. 1984); Chicken Delight, 448
F.2d at 51; see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451,
483-84 (1992) (holding that summary judgment was improper given evidence that the
tie was not necessary to ensure quality).
49. Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 51; accord Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d at 104042.
SO. See Mozart Co., 833 F.2d at 1349-50 (finding that the tie was justified in light
of the jury's finding that no less restrictive alternative existed); Krehl v. Baskin Robbins
Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1353 n.l2 (9th Cir. 1982) (noting that when the "alleged
tied product is manufactured pursuant to secret formulae, the specification alternative is
not available"); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 514-15 (2d Cir. 1964) (fmding
the proposed specifications for substitute products too detailed and complex); see also
Little Caesar Enters. v. Smith, 895 F. Supp. 884, 888 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (noting the
franchisees' failure to challenge the tie of certain proprietary items).
51. See Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d at 1040 n.12 (citing Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at
306); Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 51 (quoting Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 306).
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tion defense" -in some detail.52 The Court suggested that, if use of a
particular input enhanced the quality of the service ultimately supplied
to consumers, distributors would purchase the input willingly, that is,
without a contractual requirement.53 Thus, the Court continued, the
presence of such a requirement indicated that market power was being
exercised: "[O]nly the prospect of reducing competition would persuade a seller to adopt such a contract and only his control of the supply of the tying device ... could induce a buyer to enter one." 54 Indeed, the Court continued, the presence of market power itself suggests
that a defendant will employ a tie to "extend" that power.55
This explanation of ties reflected the spirit of the times, a spirit
that took as a given the allocation of economic tasks between intrafrrm
production, on the one hand, and market transactions, on the other.56
Such an approach flowed naturally from industrial organization's exclusive focus on price theory.57 Under this approach, all contracts that departed from some preconceived allocation of tasks between firms and
the market were seen as symptoms of the exercise of monopoly
power.58 Professor Coase summed up this intellectual climate nicely:

52. See Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 305-06. Of course, the false attribution defense
is only analogous, and not identical, to the franchise goodwill defense, insofar as the
former does not depend on the possibility of free riding. Still, lower courts rely on Stan·
dard Oil's discussion in both contexts. See supra note 51.
53. See Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 306 ("If the manufacturer's brand of the tied
product is in fact superior to that of competitors, the buyer will presumably choose it
anyway."); accord Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605
(1953) ("[A]ny intrinsic superiority of the 'tied' product would convince freely choosing buyers to select it over others, anyway."); Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d at 1041
(quoting same); see also Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503
(1969) ("[B]ecause tying arrangements generally serve no legitimate business purpose
that cannot be achieved in some less restrictive way, the presence of any appreciable restraint on competition provides a sufficient reason for invalidating the tie.").
54. Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 306; cf. Paul E. Volpp Tractor Parts, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1208, 1232 (W.D. Tenn. 1995) (fmding that a contractual provision requiring the purchase of the tied item itself establishes the existence of forcing);
Little Caesar Enters., 895 F. Supp. at 896 (same).
55. See Standard Oil, 337 U.S. at 306.
56. See Wn.LIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 7.
57. See RH. COASE, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: A PROPOSAL FOR RE.
SEARCH, reprinted in RH. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 57, 6061 (1988) [hereinafter COASE, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION]; see also Wn.LIAMSON,
EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 7; cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable An·
titrust Policy, 84 MicH. L. REv. 1696, 1701 (1986) ("Practices that look monopolistic
(because they involve cooperation) may be beneficial. Cooperation is essential in complex economic endeavors. How much is too much is a thorny problem.").
58. See Wn.LIAMSON, EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 19, 370-71
("Since there [was] nothing to be gained by introducing nonstandard terms into marketmediated exchange, the use of contract restraints was presumed to have anticompetitive
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One important result of this preoccupation with the monopoly problem is
that if an economist finds something - a business practice of one sort or
other - that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation. And as we are very ignorant in this field, the number of ununderstandable practices tends to be rather large, and the reliance on a monopoly explanation is frequent.59

1)ring contracts are such a suspect practice. Instead of relying on
the market- the buyer's unfettered choice- such arrangements allocate by contract the selection of the tied product to the seller of the tying product, and thus depart from a preconceived division of responsibilities between buyer and seller. A focus on price theory as the
criterion for interpreting contractual arrangements then, naturally leads
one to suspect that tying contracts are "forced" on an unwilling purchaser through the exercise of monopoly power. Given these premises,
it is perhaps not surprising that courts have required the defendant to
show that the challenged tie is the only means of preserving goodwill.60
Similar approaches govern other presumptively illegal arrangements.61
In the rule of reason context, proof that a contract restrains trade
- usually accomplished by proof of market power - creates a presumption that the restraint is on balance anticompetitive and hence unlawful.62 The defendant can rebut this presumption and thus avoid a directed verdict only by adducing evidence from which the fact !mder
could conclude that the restraint serves procompetitive objectives that

purpose and [e]ffect"); Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Rachet in Antitrust Law?, 60
TExAs L. REv. 705, 715 (1982) (discussing the "inhospitality tradition of antitrust").
59. COASE,lNoUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 57, at 67.
60. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949); International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1947); ffiM v. United States, 298 U.S.
131, 138-40 (1936); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. lnlage Technical Servs., Inc., 504
451, 483-84 (1992).
61. Indeed, as suggested earlier, such a showing is generally a sufficient condition
as well. See ABA SAMPLE JURY INSTRUCITONS IN ClVIL ANTITRusT CASES B-103
(1990). Such an approach in this per se context is thus less hostile to assertions that
procompetitive benefits justify a restraint than the approach taken in the rule of reason
and merger contexts. In these contexts, the absence of a less restrictive alternative is
merely a necessary condition for showing that a restraint or merger is ultimately
procompetitive. See, e.g., 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRusT LAW 'li 1507 (1986);
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at§ 4.0 (stating that agencies will
not challenge merger that is the least restrictive means of producing efficiencies that
outweigh procompetitive effects).
62. See Capital lnlaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Medical Assocs., 996 F.2d
537, 543-46 (2d Cir.·1993) (holding that proof of market power or a naked restraint of
output shifts the burden to the defendant); Chicago Prof!. Sports Ltd. Partnership v.
NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 673-74 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that a naked restraint on output
shifts the burden of justification to defendant).
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outweigh its anticompetitive effects.63 At this point, the ultimate burden
of proof shifts back to the plaintiff, who can meet this burden by proving that either: (1) the objectives could be realized through a less restrictive arrangement, or (2) the agreement's benefits are outweighed by
its anticompetitive effects.64 Similarly, where a proponent of a merger
that facilitates the exercise of market power asserts that efficiencies created by the arrangement outweigh any anticompetitive effects, courts
and enforcement agencies require a showing that the efficiencies could
riot be achieved through a less anticompetitive transaction. 65 These tests,
of course, constitute a form of partial equilibrium welfare analysis and
thus only re-emphasize the influence of price theory on antitrust
jurisprudence.66
As shown below, the preoccupation with monopoly explanations
identified by Professor Coase has led courts and scholars astray in their
assessment of certain tying arrangements.67 In particular, courts have
misconceived the relationship between market power, on the one hand,
and tying contracts that serve procompetitive objectives, on the other.
Once the nature of this misconception is exposed, it becomes clear that
the similar treatment of franchise tying contracts and presumptively anticompetitive restraints and mergers is not justified. Instead, a showing
that a tie produces significant benefits undermines the premises that
63. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678-79 (3d Cir. 1993); Capital
Imaging, 996 F.2d at 543; see also 7 AREEDA, supra note 61, at <JI 1507b ("Once the
plaintiff satisfies his burden of persuasion on the existence of a significant restraint, he
will prevail unless the defendants introduce evidence sufficient to allow the tribunal to
find that their conduct promotes a legitimate objective.").
64. See Capital Imaging, 996 F.2d at 543; Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 679; see also
Chicago Projl. Sports, 961 F.2d at 675. But cf. American Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday
Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975) (rejecting the least restrictive alternative test);
Thomas C. Arthur, Workable Antitrust Law: The Statutory Approach to Antitrust, 62
TUL. L. REv. 1163, 1194 (1988) (suggesting that law on less restrictive alternatives is
unclear).
65. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at § 4.0; United
States v. IVACO, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 1409, 1425-27 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (holding that the
justification that a merger would facilitate the creation of a new product was not cognizable when such a product could be created by a less anticompetitive means).
66. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 7, at 107-15; WILLIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 369 (discussing the influence of "partial equilibrium welfare economics model" in antitrust analysis); Williamson, Welfare Tradeoffs, supra note 2; see
also Wesley J. Liebeler, Comments, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 335, 335-36 (1985) (noting that
the rule of reason is employed "to balance the gains from increased efficiency against
the losses from increased market power."). But see Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven
C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over
Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209, 278 (1986) (arguing that the rule of reason analysis accounts
for efficiency claims "principally by subjecting assertions of anticompetitive effects to
close scrutiny when plausible efficiency arguments are offered").
67. See infra text accompanying notes 68-81.
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support this similar treatment. Thus, such a showing by a franchisor
should rebut any presumption that the contract has been "forced" on a
purchaser through an exercise of market power, a necessary condition
to per se liability.

II. A MISGUIDED
A.

INQUIRY

Missing the Mark

As shown above, current law relies on an elaborate framework to
sort procompetitive from anticompetitive tying contracts, a system parallel to that employed in other antitrust contexts.68 Given this legal landscape, economists and others who assert the procompetitive benefits of
such contracts and who attack results in particular cases emp:hasize the
perceived lack of market power in most franchise contexts, as well as
the absence of less restrictive alternatives that would advance the
franchisor's procompetitive objectives.69 Professors Klein and Saft, for
instance, concede that franchisors possess some economic power as a
result of the product differentiation associated with their respective
trademarks.70 They argue, however, that such power should not be
deemed "market power" for antitrust purposes, and that the true market
for the tying product is the market for all franchise opportunities, not
simply the market for franchises in what might constitute a relevant
product market for other antitrust purposes.71 They also assert that pur68. See supra text accompanying notes 14-27, 45-46.
69. See Dugan, supra note 27, at 152; Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 345; Rubin,
supra note 10, at 232.
70. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 354-61. This concession seems compelled
by economic evidence and theory. See Kaufmann & LaFontaine, supra note 28, at 43738 (concluding that McDonald's purposely leaves economic rents downstream for
franchisees).
71. Thus, even if consumers might view "fast food," for instance, as a relevant
market, Klein and Saft would argue that the market in which to measure a franchisor's
market power vis-a-vis prospective franchisees is a market that includes, for instance,
the opportunity to operate a gasoline station. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 356;
Rubin, supra note 10, at 232. Others have suggested that, even if the market for the tying product is defined more narrowly, the Jefferson Parish defmition of "market
power" will "doom" the franchise tying cases. See Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 704-05 (7th Cir. 1984) (opinion of Posner, J.) (dicta). As
shown below, Judge Posner's prediction has proven premature in light of the Court's recent Eastman Kodak decision. See infra text accompanying notes 73-77. Moreover,
whether "doomed" or not, franchise tying cases have continued to make their way
through the federal courts long after the, Jefferson Parish decision. See, e.g., Digital
Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Technologies, Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 761 (7th Cir. 1996); Roy
B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379 (5th Cir. 1994); Town Sound
and Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1992) (en bane);
Faulkner Advertising Assocs. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 905 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1990);
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portedly less restrictive alternatives will not advance procompetitive
objectives equally well as outright requirements.72
These critiques of current doctrine, while no doubt powerful in and
of themselves, are ultimately inadequate to the task of creating a comprehensive method of analyzing tying arrangements in the franchise
context. As an initial matter, these attacks do not account for the Supreme Court's recent Kodak decision, which found that the existence of
relationship-specific investments can confer "market power" on a manufacturer, even when that manufacturer has no power in the market for
the product in question.73 Indeed, some scholars have suggested that
Kodak requires a fmding that market power is present whenever a seller
faces a downward sloping demand curve, even if such power flows
from nonstructural factors such as the presence of uninformed buyers.74
Parts and Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1988); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1988); Mozart Co. v.
Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987); Metrix Warehouse, Inc.
v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1987); Queen City Pizza,
Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1055 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Paul E. Volpp Tractor
Parts, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1208 (W.D. Tenn. 1995); Little Caesar Enters. v. Smith, 895 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Mich. 1995); Acquaire v. Canada Dry Bottling
Co. of N.Y., Inc., No. CV-90-4005(81), 1993 WL 741551 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 1993). Further, the approach offered here would dispense with any inquiry into market power
when procompetitive effects are present, thus rendering procompetitive arrangements
impervious to the fluctuating defmitions of market power that have emanated from the
Supreme Court over the past several decades. See also infra text accompanying notes
128-35; cf. Mozart Co., 833 F.2d at 1348-51 (assuming, arguendo, the presence of market power but fmding the tie justified).
72. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 353-54. Professor Klein places similar emphasis on the absence of market power at the time of contracting in a recent commentary criticizing the Kodak decision. See Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis After Kodak, 3 SUP. Cr. EcoN. REv. 43, 53 (1993). It should be noted
that, while Professors Klein and Saft advocate the adoption of a rule of reason approach
in the tying context generally, they do not explain how a fact fmder is to weigh the
procompetitive benefits of such contracts against their anticompetitive effects. The mere
fact that a less restrictive alternative is also less effective, of course, does not prove that
procompetitive effects predominate. This article, by contrast, argues that the presence of
such procompetitive effects ipso facto suggests the absence of any anticompetitive impact, thereby rendering superfluous any inquiry into market power or anticompetitive
effect of the sort ordinarily associated with the rule of reason. See infra text accompanying notes 138-41.
73. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
See also PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HovENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw
'lfli 1709.2a-c (Supp. 1995); Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes it on the Chin: Imperfect
Information Could Play a Crucial Role in the Post-Kodak World, 62 ANTITRUST L.J.
193, 200 (1993).
74. See Arthur, supra note 8, at 54-56; Michael S. Jacobs, Market Power Through
Imperfect Information: The Staggering Implications of Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services and a Modest Proposal for Limiting Them, 52 Mo. L. REv. 336
(1993). Such an approach would be a throwback to the pre-Jefferson Parish days,
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Such "nonstructural" market power, of course, is the very type that
Klein and Saft concede that franchisors possess.75 Thus, one scholar
concluded that, if Kodak means what it says, "[f]loodgates would open
for franchisees to sue franchisors. " 76 Franchisees, sometimes relying on
the reasoning of Kodak, continue to allege that franchisors with tiny
shares of any "franchising market" possess "market power. "n
More important, such attacks suffer from a basic flaw, namely the
implicit assumption that the presence or absence of some form of market power is necessarily relevant to a determination of whether ties are
ultimately anticompetitive. This approach in turn seems to follow from
the common assumption that tying contracts are "forced" on purchasers
through the exercise of market power, whether or not they produce
procompetitive benefits.78 Similar assumptions underlie judicial statewhere the slightest product differentiation constituted "economic power" of the sort
necessary for a per se violation. See United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962)
(finding that a copyright confers economic power); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448
F.2d 43, 49-50 (9th Cir. 1971) (finding that a trademark confers such power); see also
Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 496 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the court's definition of market power is inconsistent with Jefferson Parish).
75. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 357 (arguing that franchisors face downward sloping demand curves as a result of product differentiation); see also Arthur,
supra note 8, at 33-36 (product differentiation can confer "market power" in the form
of a downward sloping demand curve).
76. Eleanor M. Fox, Eastman Kodak Company v. Image Technical Services, Inc.
-Information Failure as Soul or Hook?, 62 ANrrrn.usT LJ. 759, 766 (1994).
77. See Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 922 F. Supp. 1055, 106263 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Plaintiff's 1st Amended Complaint Cj[ 64, Little Caesar Enters. v.
Smith, 895 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (alleging the possession of market power by
Little Caesar); Plaintiff's 2d Amended Complaint Cj[ 329, Acquaire v. Canada Dry Bottling Co. of N.Y., Inc., No. CV-90-4005(SJ), 1993 WL 741551 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 1993)
(alleging the possession of market power by Canada Dry because plaintiffs "are for all
practical purposes locked into their distributorships").
78. See Klein, supra note 72, at 53 ("When a tie is anticipated and, therefore, a
'hold-up' is not occurring, it is clear that the level of competition should be measured
before the buyer makes any specific investments. If the market at this point in time is
competitive, then the tie is merely part of the freely negotiated competitive price.").
The negative implication of this statement, of course, is that when true market power
exists, the tie is not "freely negotiated," that is, it is "forced" on an unwilling franchisee. See RicHARD A PoSNER. ANrrrn.usT LAW 175-76 (1976) (arguing that the
benefits created by an "imposed" tie must be weighed against its anticompetitive effects, but that the former will usually predominate). Indeed, many apparently believe
that ties can only be obtained through an exercise of market power. See, e.g., Joseph P.
Bauer, A Simplified Approach to Tying Arrangements: A Legal and Economic Analysis,
33 VAND. L. REv. 283, 332 (1980) (arguing that the existence of a tie ipso facto establishes that it was imposed through an exercise of market power); Ward S. Bowman, Jr.,
Tying Arrangements And The Leverage Problem, 61 YALE LJ. 19, 20 (1957) ("To sell
or lease one commodity, the tying product, advantageously on condition that it be used
with another commodity, the tied product, requires the existence of monopoly power in economic theory, the ability to control supply.") (emphasis added); W. David Slaw-
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ments that such benefits result from a "coerced purchase" of the tied
item,79 statements that recall the Court's conclusion in Standard Oil that
any tying contract executed by a finn with market power has been imposed against the purchaser's will through the exercise of that power.80
These assumptions are not attributable to such scholars; they instead flow naturally from the law of tying and its underlying economic
assumptions.81 Whatever their source, however, the assumptions are
misguided. A complete account of franchise tying contracts must recognize that, in light of the low transaction costs that characterize the
franchise relationship, a franchisor will not use whatever market power
it might possess to "impose" a tie when that tie can produce benefits
associated with such contractual integration. Thus, the focus on market
power and less restrictive alternative_s, though perfectly natural given
the partial equilibrium framework that dominates antitrust law and the
premises that underlie tying jurisprudence, rests on a false analogy between procompetitive ties, on the one hand, and beneficial restraints or
mergers that are characterized by the coexistence of procompetitive and
anticompetitive effects, on the other. While a showing that procompetitive benefits flow from the latter class of conduct simply suggests further balancing along the lines of a partial equilibrium welfare analysis,
economic theory suggests that such an approach is not useful in low
transaction cost settings - that tying contracts that actually reduce free
riding are unrelated to any exercise of market power. Thus, a showing
by a franchisor that a tie produces such effects should negate any presumption of "forcing" and establish the contract's prima facie legality.

son, A New Concept of Competition: Reanalyzing Tie-In Doctrine After Hyde, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 257 (1985) (same); see also Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust Tie-In Analysis
After Kodak: Understanding the Role of Market Imperfections, 62 ANTITRUST L.J.,
Wmter 1994, at 263, 285. But see Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power
Through Leverage, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 515, 546 (1985) (arguing that power over a tying product is not necessary for the creation of certain procompetitive benefits).
79. See Krehl v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348, 1353 n.13 (9th
Cir. 1982) ("In some cases, however, this coerced purchase may be justified as necessary to prevent the sale of inferior goods under the franchisor's trademark.") (emphasis
added).
80. See Standard Oil v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949); Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033, 1041 (4th Cir. 1987)
(contending that if the tied product were superior, the buyer would purchase it "willingly," without a contractual requirement); Paul E. Volpp Tractor Parts, Inc., v. Caterpillar, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1208, 1209 (W.D. Tenn. 1995) (stating that the existence of a
contractual requirement establishes "forcing"); Little Caesar Enters. v. Smith 895 F.
Supp. 884, 896 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (same).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 51-68.
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B. Preventing the Free Ride (Voluntarily)
Given the assertion that certain tying contracts mitigate free rlding,
it may seem odd to argue that such contracts are unrelated to economic
power. After all, such free riding is the result of reputation's status as a
collective good, a status made possible by the inability of a franchisee
to charge a price to those who reap the benefits of its use of quality inputs.82 Thus, free riding is in reality a symptom of purely voluntary contracts, a symptom that is usually cured by coercion.83
It would seem, then, that a franchisor would have to use market
power or some other means of coercion to mitigate the free riding problem, as no franchisee would voluntarily agree to a contract preventing
such behavior. Indeed, in other contexts, economists have suggested that
market power may be exercised to prevent free riding. 84 ·
Such a conclusion would only further complicate the analysis of
franchise tying contracts. Certainly the realization would call into question the Supreme Court's assertion in Standard Oil that beneficial ties
need not be imposed by an exercise of market power.85 Still, by conceding that market power is being exercised, this approach would provide
little guidance to courts ·that must separate procompetitive from anticompetitive ties.86 Indeed, under such a rubric, the least restrictive alternative approach would seem to make· sense as a means of "sifting"
the exercise of market power out of what otherwise may be a procompetitive arrangement; that is, forcing firms to achieve their objectives

82. See OLSON, supra note 29, at 14-16.
83. See id. at 12~16; see also Lehnhert v. Ferris Faculty Assn., 500 U.S. 507, 520
(1991) (recognizing the compelling state interest in preventing free riding by coercing
nonunion employees to support a union financially); Abood v. Detroit Bd. ofEduc., 4~1
u.s. 209 (1977).
84. See OLSON, supra note 29, at 145 (arguing that trade associations use monopoly power to coerce contributions to support lobbying efforts); Thomas G. Moore, The
Purpose of Licensing, 4 JL. & EcoN. 93, 114 (1961) (same); cf. Telser, supra note 39,
at 87 ("[A} necessary condition to a manufacturer's use of resale price maintenance is
that he must possess some degree of monopoly control over the price of the product because his product is differentiated in economically relevant respects from competing
products."). But cf. Alan J. Meese, Limitations on Corporate Speech: Protection for
Shareholders or Abridgment of Expression?, 2 WM. & MARY Bn.L RTs. J. 305, 336-37
(1993) (concluding that corporations mitigate certain free rider problems without exercising market power).
85. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293,306 (1949).
86. Cf. Edward A. Snyder & Thomas E. Kauper, Misuse of the Antitrust Laws:
The Competitor Plaintiff, 90 MICH. L. REv. 551, 589 (1991) (arguing that the anticompetitive effects of vertical integration coexist with procompetitive benefits, rendering it
difficult to screen procompetitive practices from anticompetitive ones).

130

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:111

with the least possible exercise of market power. 87 Otherwise, parties
would be at the mercy of juries acting pursuant to instructions that say
no more than "determine which is larger: the procompetitive or the anticompetitive effect. " 88
Happily for all concerned, no such result is required. Contrary to
the suggestion above, the exercise of market power is not necessary for
the creation of a tying contract that eliminates free riding. Instead, when
such a contract does create these benefits, bargaining between the parties in a competitive environment will result in such agreements. Moreover, given the propensity of this process to produce these contracts,
any attempt by a franchisor to "impose" a beneficial tying requirement
by exercising market power would be an irrational waste of that power,
requiring, as it would, the franchisor to charge less than the monopoly
price. Thus, a showing by a franchisor that the tie does, in fact, produce
these benefits suggests that no market power has been exercised and
obviates the need for any further balancing.89
That the parties would agree freely to such a contractual requirement can be shown easily. Assume that a franchisor awards 100
franchises. In a world in which bargaining is costless, these 100
awardees would agree collectively to invest in the optimal amount of
quality to associate with the trademark under which they would operate.90 More formally, franchisees would agree collectively to invest in
quality until the marginal dollar invested in superior inputs yielded less
than one dollar in collective benefits in the form of increased demand
for the franchise product that results from a reputation for high quality.
Such an agreement would occur, without the intervention of the
franchisor and regardless of whether the franchisor possessed market
power. Each franchisee would recognize that whatever benefits it might
derive individually from the right to free ride - that is, to spend less
87. See generally 7 AREEDA, supra note 61, 'l!1505; Grimes, supra note 78, at
285.
88. See ABA SAMPLE JURY INsTRUCTIONS IN Cxvn.. ANTITRUST CASES A-7-8;

cf. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 230 n.ll (D.C.
Cir. 1986) ("Weighing effects in any direct sense [in a rule of reason case] will usually
be beyond judicial capabilities.").
89. Cf. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 66, at 278 nn.216-17 (suggesting that
efficiency "justifications" for suspect conduct are usually assertions that the conduct is
not suspect - not an exercise of market power in the first place).
90. This assumes, of course, that these 100 franchisees could differentiate themselves from franchisees operating under agreements with other franchisors. Absent such
differentiation, other franchisees could reap the benefits of investment by the 100. Such
differentiation, and the resulting reduction in free riding, is one function of trademark
law. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & EcoN. 265, 270 (1987).
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than the optimal amount on inputs - would be outweighed by the individual benefits, in the form of increased demand for its products it
would secure if each of its fellow franchisees refused to exercise that
same right. Put another way, even though each franchisee would begin
with the right to impose severe externalities on its fellows by using inferior inputs, bargaining between the parties would result in an agreement not to exercise that right. This foreseeable result, of course, is a
necessary implication of the Coase Theorem.91
In reality, significant transaction costs prevent the creation of such
an agreement. Bargaining over this type of contractual term would
prove to be intractable, as individual franchisees would have an incentive to "hold out," seeking bribes for their commitment not to free
ride.92 Indeed, by threatening to "free ride" on the efforts of their fellows, one or a few franchisees could extort most of the benefits of
maintaining high quality.93 Moreover, enforcement of such an agreement would be impractical. Because actions for breach of contract
would probably prove to be an inadequate sanction,94 franchisees would
have to adopt collectively some termination procedure to facilitate selfhelp.95 For instance, they could agree to force a sale, upon a majority
vote, of a franchisee caught shirking. Yet such a mechanism would give
rise to opportunistic behavior by franchisees, who could threaten termination of franchises to appropriate their value.96
91. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1
(1960).
92. See OLSON, supra note 29, at 40-41. A particularly aggressive franchisee
could threaten even to engage in quality investment that is suboptimal from an individual perspective and, by means of such a threat, appropriate to itself gains greater than
those produced by the proper collective investment in quality. Cf. WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EcONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 34
n.5 (1987).
93. Cf. OLSON, supra note 29, at 41 ("Whenever unanimous participation is required, any single holdout has extraordinary bargaining power; he may be able to demand for himself most of the gain that would come from any group-oriented action.");
Meese, supra note 84, at 322 (arguing that the requirement of unanimous consent for
corporate speech would create severe holdout problems).
94. See Muris, supra note 34, at 575 ("[F]ranchisees can 'cheat' on quality in
ways that are costly to detect and prove. Moreover, clauses specifying elements of quality will often prove expensive to draft in complete detail and certainly to enforce in
court . . . . ").
95. Cf. Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual
Arrangements, 92 PAPERS & PRoc. AM. EcoN. AssN. 356 (1980) (concluding that the
threat of termination by a franchisor can deter shirking); Benjamin Klein & Keith B.
Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. PoL.
EcoN. 615, 616 (1981).
96. Cf. Muris, supra note 34, at 577 (describing the incentives of the franchisor to
engage in such behavior). Such incentives would be particularly keen in this context.
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In the real world, then, one would not expect such an agreement.
There is, however, another mechanism for ensuring an optimal investment in quality and the resulting reputation of the franchise system. As
sole owner of the franchise trademark, the franchisor internalizes the
benefits associated with the elimination of free riding. The vehicle of
such internalization, is, of course, the compensation that the franchisor
receives for use of the trademark by franchisees. Such compensation
usually takes two forms: an up-front payment for a franchise opportunity and an annual franchise fee, measured as a percentage of gross revenues.97 By eliminating free riding, then, the franchisor can enhance the
compensation it receives for the sale of each franchise. Franchisees, of
course, will be willing to pay more "up front" for the right to participate in a franchise system not characterized by free riding, and aggregate franchise fees will rise, as reduced free riding translates into higher
demand and revenues.
Given its status as sole owner of the franchise trademark, we
would expect the franchisor to attempt to maximize its revenues by including a tying requirement in any contract ancillary to the alienation of
the franchise trademark.98 Moreover, because the franchisor can refuse
to part with the trademark absent an agreement to such a term, it can
exclude from the benefits of quality enhancement those prospective
franchisees who will not agree to adhere to the requirement.
Of course, once the standard franchise contract includes such a
term, individual franchisees might be willing to pay a premium for a
franchise contract without it. Having received such an atypical contract,
the maverick could then free ride on the efforts of those franchisees
who had signed the standard contract and thus were using inputs of sufficient quality. However, any "free riding premium" that a maverick
would be willing to pay would necessarily be less than the revenue that
a franchisor would forgo as a result of the failure to include the requireUnlike franchisors, franchisees have no long-term reputational interest to protect, and
thus would be more likely to engage in such opportunistic behavior. See id. at 577-78
(arguing that continuous dealing in franchises by franchisors necessitates the maintenance of reputation and thus deters opportunistic terminations). Moreover, no single
franchisee would be accountable for such actions, further attenuating whatever reputational loss would attend termination of a franchise.
97. See Antony W. Dnes, A Case-Study Analysis of Franchise Contracts, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 367, 382 (1993) (noting that the most common method of franchisor compensation is the "coupling of a lump sum with a sales royalty"); Kabir C. Sen, The Use
of Initial Fees and Royalties in Business-Format Franchising, 14 MANAGERIAL & DECISION EcON. 175 (1993).
98. Cf. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 221-23
(D.C. Cir. 1986). See generally Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the
Single Owner: One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & EcoN. 553, 556-57 (1993).
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ment in the maverick's contract, as other franchisees, recognizing the
reduced value of the opportunity, would pay less for it, and the
franchisor would receive lower franchise fees. 99 Put another way, while
the franchisor may "offer" franchise contracts that do not include such
a requirement, it will do so only at a price higher than any franchisee is
willing to pay. 100
Thus, even though the franchisor's relinquishment of control over
the trademark and the resulting division of labor between franchisor and
franchisee might suggest that each prospective franchisee has the
"right" to impose externalities on the franchise system by purchasing
inferior inputs, the parties will instead allocate the right to choose inputs to the franchisor. 101 More precisely, where circumstances are conducive to free riding, the franchisor will induce the franchisee prospectively to internalize the externalities resulting from the use of inferior
inputs by offering to "unbundle" the right to choose inputs from the
right to employ the trademark for a higher price, a price that reflects the
harm imposed on the franchise system by the free riding that would follow such unbundling. 102 Because this harm, and the resulting higher
price, are greater than the gain from free riding to any individual franchisee, we would not expect any franchisee to negotiate for such unbundling.103 In this way, the law's designation of the franchisor as "sole
owner" of the franchise trademark ensures that the reputation associ99. Indeed, to the extent that franchisors are compensated by franchise fees, franchisees need not "recognize" the deleterious effects of free riding for such bargaining
to take place. So long as the franchisor can predict the reduction in franchise fees that
would result from free riding, it will internalize the effects of unbundling the trademark
from the right to select the franchisee's inputs. Moreover, failure to include such a
clause in one contract will negate the franchisor's ability to warrant that such clauses
are included in all contracts. See infra text accompanying notes 106-14.
100. Cf. WILLIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 33-34 (arguing that a seller will charge higher prices for contracts that do not contain safeguards
that can prevent opportunistic behavior).
101. See id. at 27 (concluding that nonstandard contracts are often methods of
properly assigning complex property rights).
102. Cf. Coase, supra note 91, at 4-6; WILLIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS,
supra note 8, at 33-34.
103. It bears emphasis here that the franchisor's decision to charge a higher price
to those franchisees that would opt for a contract without a tying requirement is logically unrelated to any exercise of market power insofar as that price is justified by the
higher cost - that is to say, the externalities borne by the franchise system that result
from a franchisee's failure tq abide by such a requirement See generally United States
v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 55 (1962) (cost-justified price differential does not constitute forcing); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust
Cases, 94 HAR.v. L. REv. 937 (1981) (defining power as the ability to price above
cost); Donald F. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws,
72 HAR.v. L. REv. 50, 66-67 (1958).
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ated with the trademark never becomes a collective good in the first
place. 104
Seen in this light the inclusion of a tying clause can be a form of
product differentiation that enhances the value of the franchise, value
that will be divided between the franchisor and franchisees. 105 Such differentiation consists of more than a promise by an individual franchisee
to purchase certain inputs only from the franchisor; it also depends on
each franchisee's knowledge that other franchisees are observing similar
terms. 106 Franchisees cannot observe such adherence directly; they must
depend on the franchisor to police uniform adherence to the rule. 107
A franchisee cannot observe in advance whether a franchisor has
included similar terms in prior contracts, or whether the franchisor intends to include them in all future contracts. 108 Of course, thoroughly
rational franchisees will realize that franchisors will include such
clauses unless doing so reduces the value of the franchise trademark. 109
Less rational franchisees, concerned that a franchisor may act opportunistically by refusing to include or enforce these terms in some contracts, must rely on a warranty by the franchisor that such terms have

104. See R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & EcoN. 357, 360
(1974) (arguing that the proper assignment of property rights can transfonn a collective
good into a private one); Epstein, supra note 98, at 556-57 (arguing that the legal assignment of property rights should replicate the "sole owner" standard so as to minimize externalities and holdout problems).
105. In this sense, franchise contracts are analogous to other contracts that are, in
fact, products. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 212-15 (1991) (arguing that states compete to provide the most efficient corporate law in the fonn of enabling statutes that are analogous
to standard contracts).
106. See generally R. Preston McAfee & Marius Schwartz, Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity, 84 AM.
EcoN. REv. 210, 223-24 (1994) (describing the incentives of franchisors to make credible commitments regarding the uniformity of contractual tenns).
107. As Professor Rubin explained:
[W]e must consider what the franchisee is buying when he buys a franchise. The
main item purchased is the trademark of the franchise. This is valuable because
consumers have a good deal of infonnation about price and quality sold by establishments with a given trademark. Consumers have this infonnation precisely because the franchisor polices franchises and makes certain that quality standards
are maintained.
Rubin, supra note 10, at 227-28.
108. In this way, a franchise is analogous to a durable good, the characteristics of
which cannot be observed in advance. See generally George A. Akerloff, The Market
for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 QJ. EcoN. 489-90
(1970).
109. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text
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been and will be included and enforced in each contract. 110 By giving
such a warranty a franchisor can expose itself to common law fraud actions and place a substantial asset- its reputation- at risk. 111 Just as
a corporation can distinguish its securities by making warranties about
its operation, 112 or as a state can distinguish its corporate law, 113 so too
can a franchisor distinguish its product by warranting that it will seek
and enforce requirements that control free riding. 114
Such a warranty need not consist of an explicit contractual clause.
An oral statement of extrinsic fact - "this is a form contract, the same
terms apply to everyone" - will suffice. 115 Indeed, in many states,
110. Cf. McMee & Schwartz, supra note 106, at 223-25. Alternatively, a
franchisor could commit always to offer the same terms to all franchisees. See id. at
215; Kaufmann & LaFontaine, supra note 28, at 430 (noting that "McDonald's typically allows its franchisees to rewrite their franchise contract at the termination of the
original agreement, at the [same] terms offered to new franchisees"). Such a commitment would eliminate any possibility that a "maverick" franchisee would be willing to
pay a franchisor not to include a tying requirement in its contract For, once such a contract was available to the maverick, it would become available to all, thus destroying its
value to the maverick. See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.
111. See Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private
Disclosure About Product Quality, 24 J.L. & EcoN. 461, 470-71 (1981); George L.
Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE LJ. 1297, 1303-06
(1981) (describing the product differentiation theory of warranties).
112. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and
the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669, 677 (1984).
113. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CoRPORATE LAW
37-44 (1993).
114. Such differentiation, of course, makes possible the most effective method of
enforcing the various terms in the franchise contract, including the tying requirement,
namely, the threat of termination, which deprives the franchisee of the economic rents
associated with its right to distribute its product under the trademark. See Kaufman &
Lafontaine, supra note 28 (concluding that McDonald's leaves rents downstream to facilitate the control of franchisees through the threat of termination); Benjamin Klein et
al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process,
21 J.L. & EcoN. 297 (1978).
115. See Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540,
1545 (7th Cir. 1990) ("A silent contract does not prevent action based on an antecedent
lie."); Caribe BMW, Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, 821 F.
Supp. 802, 806 (D.P.R. 1993) (recounting the allegation that a franchisor "incorrectly
represent[ed] that these contracts were 'standard' "), vacated, 19 F.3d 745 (1st Cir.
1994); cf. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grummon Sys. Support Corp., 1991-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
«j[ 69,487, at 66,073 (D. Mass. 1991), affd., 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994). Indeed, the
covenant of good faith implied in each contract may itself prohibit differential treatment
that undermines the value of a franchise opportunity. See Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat
Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 728 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that a covenant of good faith prevents
a franchisor from destroying "the right of the other party to enjoy the fruits of the contract"); Hentze v. Unverferht, 604 N.E.2d 536, 539 (Til. App. 1992) (same). Moreover,
contractual terms that differ from those contained in the franchisor's standard contract
are not enforceable absent disclosure and conscious assent by the franchisee. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 211 (1979).
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such a warranty need not be given at all because laws compel the disclosure of tying requirements and prohibit discriminatory treatment of
franchisees. 116 In New York, for instance, a franchisor must register its
proposed standard franchise agreement with the state, and disclose any
requirement that a franchisee purchase goods from the franchisor. 111 An
attempt to enforce a provision not included in the registered agreement,
or failure to enforce one of its terms against certain franchisees, likely
would be illegal. 118 Finally, legal duties to one side, franchisors possess
powerful incentives to make and keep such promises. By maintaining a
reputation for uniform policing, a franchisor will enhance its own
wealth as well as that of the franchise system as a whole. 119
Moreover, unlike the situation attending our hypothetical agreement between 100 franchisees, there is no potential for a holdout problem. Such holdouts can only occur when a franchisee possesses the
right to reduce its investment in quality and sell the resulting goods
under the same trademark used by the other ninety-nine franchisees.
Because trademark law protects the franchisor's status as "sole owner"
by assigning it a true "property right" in the trademark, 120 a franchisee
can only obtain the right to distribute products under the mark pursuant
to a contract with the franchisor. As already shown, the franchisor's sta116. See MicH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 27(e) (West 1989) (prohibiting discrimination among franchises); see also Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning
Franchising and Business Opportunity Ventures, 16 C.P.R., pt. 436 (1996).
117. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW§ 683(2)(k) (McKinney 1996).
118. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 687 (McKinney 1996) (addressing fraudulent
and unfair practices).
119. This is not to say that such negotiation will eliminate the incentive to free
ride. It is one thing to negotiate a contract; it is another to monitor and enforce compliance with its terms. See generally WD..LlAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra
note 8, at 43-84; Muris, supra note 34. Indeed, as explained infra, the very presence of
a mechanism that reduces free riding and improves the quality reputation associated
with the trademark itself creates a stronger incentive on behalf of individual franchisees
to free ride, in breach of the tying requirement. See infra text accompanying notes 21418. This fact does not change the analysis offered here, however. Whether or not individual franchisees plan to free ride, the presence of a workable contractual requirement
that improves the reputational value of the trademark will increase the value of each
franchise to each potential franchisee.
120. See Wesley-Jessen Div. of Schering Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 698 F.2d
862, 867 (7th Cir. 1983) ("Bausch & Lomb's loss of control over its reputation justifies
a finding of irreparable harm even if it could demonstrate no loss of sales or market
share."); Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HAR.v. L. REv. 1089 (1972) (defming a
"property right" in economic terms as the ability to protect an interest by injunction
and/or an action for punitive damages); Fred S. McChesney, Deception, Trademark Infringement, and the Lanham Act: A Property-Rights Reconciliation, 78 VA. L. REv. 49,
55 (1992) (noting that economic theory suggests that the law should assign a true property right to the owner of a trademark).
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tus as sole owner will induce it to adopt provisions that ameliorate free
riding, and to exclude from use of the trademark those who will not
abide by those terms. Moreover, when a tying requirement can reduce
free riding, the individual gains from such behavior will be outweighed
by the resulting harm to the franchise system, and no individual franchisee will be willing to pay a sufficient price to convince the
franchisor not to include such a requirement. 121 In these circumstances,
there is simply no opportunity for a franchisee to hold out. 122
C. Exercise of Power or Voluntary Agreement?
The mere fact that a franchisor could convince a franchisee to
agree to a provision that prevents opportunistic behavior does not, as a
logical matter, preclude its imposition by an exercise of market power,
an imposition that would require an antitrust tribunal to treat the contract under scrutiny as a tie and to engage in the sort of partial equilibrium welfare analysis described earlier. 123 Further analysis, however,
shows that, in light of the low transaction costs involved, the presence
of such benefits strongly suggests that a requirement that produces such
benefits is not a consequence of "forcing" - that a firm with market
power would not choose to exercise that power by imposing such a requirement. As a result, partial equilibrium welfare analysis is an improper vehicle for evaluating the sort of tying contracts under
discussion.
It is axiomatic that firms cannot exercise market power twice. 124 A
firm that possesses market power over the tying product cannot both
121. See supra text accompanying notes 98-103.
122. See Epstein, supra note 98, at 557 (arguing that the common law's definition
and assignment of property rights is designed to minimize the combined costs associated with externalities and holdouts). See generally RicHARD A. POSNER, EcoNOMIC
ANALYSIS OF THE LAw 62 (1992) (claiming that the common law's choice of assignment of property rights is designed to mitigate the bilateral monopoly problem); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 120 (reaching the same conclusion). Vigorous competition
among franchisors does not change this result; so long as those franchisors who adopt
and adhere to such a policy are able to identify themselves to the public via trademarks
and to franchisees via warranties, franchisees will, ceteris paribus, prefer contracts with
those franchisors that prevent free riding by including and enforcing a requirements
term.
123. Cf. R. Glenn Hubbard & Robert J. Weiner, Efficient Contracting and Market
Power: Evidence from the U.S. Natural Gas Industry, 34 J.L. & EcoN. 25, 25-26
(1991) (arguing that the efficiency and market power explanations for particular contractual arrangements "are hardly mutually exclusive"); Snyder & Kauper, supra note
86, at 589 (claiming that the same factors that suggest that vertical integration will produce procompetitive effects are also necessary conditions for anticompetitive effects).
124. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 39 n.8 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
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charge a monopoly price for the product and use its power to "force" a
customer to take the tied product as wel1. 125 A firm that uses its market
power to induce consumers to purchase an unwanted tied product must
price below the monopoly level, thereby "convincing" the purchaser to
take a tied product that is either inferior or more expensive than its
alternatives. 126
Thus, firms that possess market power face a choice: exercise that
power by reducing output and pricing at a monopoly level, or set output
above the monopoly level, using the resulting reduction in the monopoly price to induce consumers, or franchisees, to purchase the "unwanted" tied product. 127 A firm that uses some quantum of its market
power to control free riding in this way must increase output above the
monopoly level and thereby forgo a portion of the monopoly profit that
it would otherwise earn. More specifically, a franchisor that wishes to
"impose" an input requirement on prospective franchisees must increase the number of franchises above that which it would otherwise offer, thereby reducing the monopoly overcharge it would otherwise
enjoy.
Given these alternatives, it seems clear that, other things being
equal, a franchisor faced with a choice between employing market
power to impose a tying requirement or simply agreeing to such a requirement through negotiation would choose the latter course to avoid
sacrificing part of its monopoly profit. In other words, given the enhanced demand for the franchisor's product that results from its warranty that all its franchisees purchase inputs from it, there is simply no
need to "induce" such an agreement by exercising market power. Any
such attempt to impose the requirement would constitute irrational behavior, behavior that antitrust law does not lightly presume. 128 Thus,
125. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 39 n.8 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
126. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 39 n.8 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 795 (1st Cir. 1988); HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, EcONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANrrrn.UST LAW 217-18 (1985) (tying is
equivalent to raising price); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1994) (§ 3 of Clayton Act) (prohibiting
the sale of or discount on the tying product on the condition that the buyer not purchase
from the seller's competitor); 9 AREEDA, supra note 61, at <JI 1700i (arguing that conditioning the receipt of a discount on the tying product upon the purchase of the tied
product is indistinguishable from an outright refusal to sell the tying product separately). Indeed, some scholars characterize tying as the purchase from customers, here
franchisees, of the right to exclude the seller's competitors from the tied product market. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 66, at 215, 219-22.
127. See Grappone, 858 F.2d at 795.
128. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 593-95
(1986); see also Goldberg v. Household Bank, F.S.B., 890 F.2d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 1989)
("A plaintiff who imputes to a defendant actions that 'makeO no economic sense' needs
solid proof to survive a motion for summary judgment.") (quoting Matsushita E/ec.,
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where a franchisor proves that a tying requirement reduces free riding,
the very existence of such benefits suggests two things. First, that the
tie is a voluntary arrangement between the parties for the purpose of realizing the benefits of reducing opportunistic behavior. Second, that
whatever market power the franchisor might possess is reflected in its
output of franchises, that is, the number of franchise opportunities it
awards. In these circumstances, any exercise of market power consists
solely of a perfectly legal reduction in output that enhances the price of
such opportunities. 129
This analysis implicitly assumes the absence of transaction costs
- that a franchisor can costlessly explain to each potential franchisee
the substantial benefits associated with a franchise opportunity that is
not beset with free riders and that the parties can costlessly negotiate
over its creation. It could be argued that, when such costs are present,
the franchisor will choose to avoid them by using its market power to
impose such a requirement outright, thereby avoiding the market failure
that results from these information costs. 130 However, such a strategy
will be rational only if these costs exceed the cost of imposing such an
arrangement by the exercise of market power. The latter cost, of course,
consists of the sum of the net present value of (1) the annual monopoly
profits foregone to induce acceptance of the tying requirement, and (2)
the cost of revealing to each franchisee the extent of the discount from
the monopoly price offered to induce acceptance. 131
Because trademark law assigns to the franchisor a property right in
the use of the trademark, franchisors need not individually "convince"
franchisees to "give up" any "right" to free ride. Instead, franchisors
can include without cost a tying requirement in the standard franchise
contract which governs the alienation of the trademark. 132 The fact that
475 U.S. at 587). While the franchisor will charge a lower price to those franchisees
that accept the requirement, this differential does not reflect any exercise of market
power but instead simply reflects the externalities to the franchise system that would result from "unbundling" the ownership of the trademark from the right to choose inputs.
See supra note 103 and accompanying text
129. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14 (stating that antitrust law draws a distinction between the mere enhancement of price and the use of monopoly power to
"leverage" into other markets).
130. Cf. Kaplow, supra note 78, at 526-27 (arguing that the rationality of a leveraging strategy depends on the prices of substitutes for the tied product).
131. Cf. George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. PoL. EcoN. 213,
218-19 (1961) (claiming that the rationality of incurring information costs depends on
the benefits of the search).
132. See Northwestern Natl. Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir.
1990) (noting that standardized contracts reduce transaction costs); REsTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 211 cmts. a & b (1979) (same). Indeed, contract law facilitates this reduction in transaction costs by rendering unenforceable contractual terms
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franchisees are not willing to pay a sufficient price for the exclusion of
such a term is not a result of high transaction costs, but instead reflects
the benefits associated with the elimination of free riding. 133 Thus, the
bargaining costs associated with creating a source tying requirement are
most likely lower than the costs of forcing a franchisee to accept it by
exercising market power. In fact, even when bargaining costs exceed
the costs of imposing a tying requirement through the exercise of market power, such a strategy may still not be rational. In some cases, this
difference may be less than the loss of income that results from the
lower demand for the franchises that will presumably occur as franchisees become less educated about the benefits of a tying requirement. 134
There is a more fundamental reason why firms need not exercise
market power to induce acceptance of a tying requirement that reduces
free riding. The use of such power is only necessary when potential
franchisees recognize the benefits of free riding and must be "convinced" to consent to a provision that renders this behavior more difficult. Any franchisee, however, that recognizes the value of free riding
also will recognize the value of its elimination; thus, no "convincing"
through the exercise of market power will be necessary.
It should be noted that the analysis offered here does not depend
upon an assumption that there are no conditions under which a fmn

that are outside the reasonable expectation of the party signing the standardized contract See Weaver v. American Oil Co., 276 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. 1971) (refusing to enforce
an unreasonable term in a standard franchise contract when the franchisor had not disclosed the existence of the term); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACfS § 211(3)
(1979). Given this background rule, it is less likely that franchisors wiii include such
terms and thus more likely that franchisees will rely on the franchisor's judgment as to
the standard terms, reducing the cost of negotiation. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CoNTRAcrs § 211 cmt b; cf. R.H. COASE, The Firm, the Market, and the Law, in THE
FIRM, THE MARKET. AND THE LAw, supra note 57, at 28 (The law can "make transactions more or less costly by altering the requirements for making a legally binding
contract").
133. See supra text accompanying notes 98-104. Of course, if a franchisee were
willing to pay a sufficient price to induce such unbundling, it could be inferred that the
benefits of eliminating free riding are attenuated, and franchisors would maximize their
income by excluding it
134. Of course, firms will only supply such information to potential franchisees if
the finn can capture the benefits of such provision, i.e., if potential franchisees cannot
use that information elsewhere without purchasing the franchise in question. Cf. Telser,
supra note 39, at 92 n.6 (noting that groups of competitive manufacturers must collectively adopt resale price maintenance in order to avoid free rider problem). See generally Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. &
BeaN. 491, 503-04 (1981) (describing the positive externalities often inherent in information production). However, there is no apparent use for such information outside the
potential franchise relationship. Thus, one would expect that franchisors can, in fact, internalize fully the benefits of producing such information.
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with market power can enhance its profits through a leverage strategy.135 Such a strategy may well be possible in limited circumstances. 136
The Jefferson Parish test, however, is in no way tailored toward identifying these circumstances, but is designed to identify instances of
"forcing." Thus, proof by a franchisor that the arrangement produces
procompetitive benefits should, at the least, cast upon the plamtiff a
burden of proving that the conditions conducive to a leverage strategy
do, in fact, exist. 137

D. Implications for Balancing
The realization that tying contracts that produce these benefits are
logically unrelated to the exercise of market power has powerful implications for the law governing the "franchise goodwill" justification,
and for other antitrust balancing tests as well. To begin with, this realization entirely undermines the premise, articulated in Standard Oil, that
beneficial tying requirements need not be "imposed" by contract that departures from atomistic competition in the form of the existence
and enforcement of a tying contract necessarily flow from the exercise
of monopoly power. 138 This result in turn calls into question the law's
135. Cf. BaRK, supra note 7, at 372-73 (claiming that a profitable leveraging
strategy is impossible); Kaplow, supra note 78 (arguing that a viable leverage strategy
is possible).
136. See Alexander C. Larson, Antitrust Tie-In Analysis After Kodak: A Comment,
63 ANTrrR.usT LJ. 239, 264 (1994) ("[T]he papers produced in the economics literature on tying and leverage theory do not support the efficacy of tying as a means of
leveraging under plausible assumptions, and they support the efficacy of tying and
leveraging only under assumptions that are not plausible.").
137. In this vein, Tom Arthur has called my attention to the distinction, drawn by
Franklin Fisher, between "exemplifying theories" and "generalizing theories." See
Franklin M. Fisher, Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View, 20 RAND J.
EcoN. 113, 117-18 (1989). According to Fisher, "[e]xemplifying theory does not tell us
what must happen. Rather it tells us what can happen." /d. at 117. Models showing that
leverage can be a profitable strategy are exactly of this variety, that is, they simply
show that a profitable leverage strategy can happen under certain limited conditions.
See Larson, supra note 136, at 264. No model of which the author is aware concludes
that the existence of the four Jefferson Parish factors renders a profitable leverage strategy likely, let alone certain. Thus, proof by a franchisor that the contract produces
procompetitive benefits such that forcing is most likely not present undermines any presumption of anticompetitive effects. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs.,
Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992) ("Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law.").
138. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949); Metrix
Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033, 1041 (4th Cir.
1987) (claiming that no tying requirement would be necessary if the purchase of the
tied product had beneficial effects); Paul E. Volpp Tractor Parts, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc.,
917 F. Supp. 1208, 1231-32 (W.D. Tenn. 1995); Little Caesar Enters. v. Smith, 895 F.
Supp. 884, 896 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (holding that the existence of a contractual tying re-

142

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:111

assumption that benefits created by a per se illegal tie necessarily coexist with anticompetitive effects. 139
These insights sever any logical connection between the usual partial equilibrium welfare rubric for analyzing mergers and trade restraints, and the approach to procompetitive justifications in the tying
context. The conventional framework, of course, is premised on the existence of significant transaction costs; absent such costs an exclusionary practice that allowed a firm to obtain market power would not occur, as consumers and others harmed by the practice would pay the finn
to abandon it. 140 In such a context, a showing of significant procompetitive benefits merely requires the fact fmder to balance those benefits
against the anticompetitive effects of the arrangement, a process
spearheaded by the less restrictive alternative test. 141 In the latter, such a
showing rebuts the presumption, articulated in Jefferson Parish, that a
defendant with market power is exercising that power - that it is engaged in "forcing" - whenever it seeks and enforces a tying contract.
Absent such forcing, the rationale for per se treatment or any presumption of anticompetitive effects collapses, as does the rationale for the
balancing implied by a partial equilibrium welfare framework. Thus, regardless whether the plaintiff can prove the four elements of a per se tying claim outlined in Jefferson Parish, a showing by a franchisor that
the challenged tie produces significant benefits should rebut any presumption of forcing and require the conclusion that the arrangement is,
in fact, an agreement unrelated to the exercise of market power, and
thus prima facie legal.
Such an approach would not constitute a rule of per se legality for
tie-ins. A plaintiff could prevail, for instance, by showing that it paid a
quirement establishes the element of forcing); see also Bowman, supra note 78, at 19
(arguing that monopoly power is necessary to require the purchase of the tied item); cf.
CoASE,lNDusTRIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 57, at 64-68 (discussing economists'
tendencies to search for monopolistic explanations to business practices they do not
understand).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 60-66; cf. Richard Craswell, 7Ying Requirements in Competitive Markets: The Consumer Protection Issues, 62 B.U. L. REv.
661, 688 (1982) (arguing that firms with market power have incentives to minimize
costs by adopting efficient contractual terms); Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of NonSubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REv. 1053, 1071-75 (1977) (same).
140. See KENNETH G. ELZINGA & Wn.LIAM BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES 3-4 (1976); Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability
Rules-A Comment, 11 J.L. & EcoN. 67,70 (1968) ("Assuming no transaction costs,
those who lose from the relative underproduction of monopolies could bribe monopolists to produce more."); Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 66, at 268-70 (explaining
how transaction costs prevent parties from investing sufficiently in the preservation of
competition).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66.
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premium price for the tied product that was unjustified by any quality
or efficiency considerations. 142 This premium would suggest that the
benefits were illusory, and that the tying requirement was imposed by
sacrificing monopoly profits, perhaps as a vehicle for price discrimination.143 Or, a plaintiff could prevail by showing directly that the benefits
claimed by the defendant do not exist. 144 It warrants emphasis, however,
that such a showing should not be inferred merely from the existence of
concentrated markets. 14s
One may fairly ask at this point what this approach would add to
current law. After all, does not the law's present tying requirement that
a private plaintiff prove an up charge to obtain damages filter procompetitive from anticompetitive ties, and obviate the need for any change in
current standards?t46
The framework advocated here would differ markedly from current
law for three reasons. First, where the government, as opposed to a private party, challenges a tie, there is no need to prove an upcharge to obtain equitable relief. 147 Second, much of the private litigation over
franchise tying contracts arises in the context of franchise terminations

142. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 52 (9th Cir. 1971) ("To ascertain whether an unlawful arrangement for the sale of products has caused injury to
the purchaser, the cost or value of the products involved, free from the unlawful arrangement, must first be ascertained.").
143. See infra text accompanying notes 202-12. As Richard Craswell suggests,
such a premium may in some circumstances be justified as a device for risk sharing
among franchisees, for those franchisees that succeed will pay a higher total premium
that those that do not. See Craswell, supra note 139, at 686-87.
144. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 48384 (1992) (rejecting the "false attribution" defense when the tie did not, in fact, enhance quality). For instance, a plaintiff could prevail by showing that the tying requirement in question was enforced only sporadically. See Data Gen. Corp., 1991-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 'II 69,487, at 66,073 (D. Mass. 1991). Under the current state of the law, of
course, lax enforcement may simply suggest that the franchisor fears treble-damage
suits. It could be argued that a plaintiff should be allowed to prevail by showing that the
tied product is actually inferior to the product the plaintiff wishes to purchase - that
the tying requirement is a means of "dumbing down" the product associated with the
trademark. There may, however, be an independent procompetitive value to such uniformity, even at the expense of some increased quality. See Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 668 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that a franchise source tying
requirement "appears to be useful to clients - perhaps because of the standardized
method of doing business, perhaps because of Comprehensive's policing of its
franchisees").
145. At any rate, even if current law did countenance such balancing in this context, the presence of a "less restrictive alternative" would not indicate that the challenged practice was unreasonable. See infra text accompanying notes 171-85.
146. See Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 52 (outlining the standards for proof of
damages).
147. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 25 (1994).
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or challenges to such contracts by competitors who want to sell the tied
product. 148 In such cases, plaintiffs need not, under current law, prove
any upcharge, but upon proving a tie, may recover damages flowing
from the termination itself, or - in the case of a competitor suit profits on lost sales of the tied product. 149 Third, even when no termination is involved, and a franchisee simply seeks damages from an
upcharge, current standards governing proof of antitrust damages are
less rigorous than those governing proof of a case-in-chief. 150 Thus, the
approach offered here will do a far better job than current law at sorting
coercive ties from those that constitute voluntary contractual
integration.
Failure to implement this approach will do more than simply deter
the adoption of procompetitive tying contracts. Maintenance of current
standards also threatens to destroy many of the benefits produced by the
specialization of function inherent in the franchise system. 151 By forcing
franchisors to adopt less effective contractual methods of preventing opportunistic behavior, for instance, these standards may dissuade the
franchisor from departing with control of the trademark in the first
place - encouraging the franchisor to integrate forward into the sale
and distribution of the franchise product. 152 Such integration need not
assume an "all or nothing" character; franchisors simply may decide to
integrate forward in a higher percentage of locations. 153 Not only will
such integration eliminate the efficiencies flowing from vertical disintegration, it will also diminish the role of independent small businesses in
the economy. 154

148. See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Technologies, Inc., 73 F.3d 756
(7th Cir. 1996) (addressing a tennination dispute); Roy B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379 (5th Cir. 1994) (same), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 779 (1995);
Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468 (3rd Cir.
1992) (en bane) (addressing a suit by a competitor); Faulkner Advertising Assocs., Inc.
v. Nissan Motor Corp., 905 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1990) (same), on rehg., 945 F.2d 694 (4th
Cir. 1991) (en bane) (afflnning lower court per curiam); Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v.
Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir. 1987) (same); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1980); Paul E. Volpp Tractor Parts, Inc. v. Caterpillar,
Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1208 (W.D. Tenn. 1995).
149. See Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d at 1042-45; Yentsch, 630 F.2d at 59 n.19.
150. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969);
Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
151. See supra note 28.
152. See, e.g., Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 356 n.39 (recounting that Jack-inthe-Box terminated 642 franchises after settling tying litigation).
153. See Mathewson & Wmter, supra note 30, at 520 (suggesting that excessive
free riding by franchisees may lead franchisors to integrate forward).
154. See supra note 28 (detailing various efficiencies created by franchising); cf.
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 n.26 (1977) (claiming that
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When failure to apply the standard suggested here does not lead to
forward integration, it may still attenuate the benefits of the franchise
system by inducing franchisors to obtain additional methods of ensuring
that franchisees actually perform agreements to invest in quality control.
In the absence of a straightforward and easily monitored tying requirement, franchisees may be induced to provide other assurances of performance, such as agreements to make additional investments in assets
that are specific to the franchise relationship. 155 Such investments, of
course, are inefficient absent their function as an assurance of contractual performance and will place franchisees at a greater risk of opportunistic behavior.
ill. PossmLE

COMPLICATIONS

The above analysis suggests that, when a franchise tying contract
produces significant procompetitive benefits, the arrangement should be
presumed procompetitive, regardless of the presence of that power. This
conclusion, however, is premature: a few considerations may counsel a
more nuanced approach.
A. Raising Rivals' Costs
The framework advocated here provides a method of identifying
those instances in which, despite the presence of market power, a tying
contract has not been forced on a franchisee by means of an exercise of
that power. Yet, the mere fact that a contract has not been forced on a
franchisee through market power does not, ipso facto, require the conclusion that the agreement is procompetitive or competitively neutral.
Indeed, the central insight of the "raising rivals' costs" school is that a
finn with little or no pre-existing market power can obtain or enhance
such power by means of a contract that raises the price its competitors
must pay for inputs.ts6
A "raising rivals' costs" strategy is at least theoretically possible
in the franchise context. By requiring franchisees to purchase some in-

courts should not, under the guise of protecting distributors, adopt rules that encourage
suppliers to integrate forward); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 319-21
(1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (same).
155. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 352-53.
156. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Analyzing Anticompetitive
Exclusion, 56 ANrrrn.usT LJ. 71, 79 (1987); Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 66, at
251 ("[A] firm need not enjoy or acquire traditional market power to gain the ability to
price above preexclusionary-rights competitive levels."); see also ThomilS G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. LJ.
241, 249 (1987).
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puts from it and not from independent sellers, a franchisor could eliminate a certain quantity of demand from the market for those inputs, depriving at least some of those independent sellers of the minimum scale
necessary to operate in the market and thus "create" a more concentrated market for the inputs in question. 157 Such concentration, of
course, could facilitate collusion among the input's remaining producers, raising the costs faced by the franchisor's rivals, and thus allow the
franchisor to raise its prices above its own costs. 158 Assume for a moment that conditions are ripe for such a strategy: there exist a concentrated market for the input(s) in question, barriers to entry into those
markets, an arrangement that forecloses a substantial share of those
markets, and inputs that are a significant portion of the cost of the
franchise product. In these circumstances a franchisor without market
power could "purchase" from its franchisees commitments not to deal
with independent sellers of the tied product, perhaps by providing a discount on the price of the franchise. 159 Indeed, to the extent that franchisees are able to share in any market power created by such contracts, by,
for instance, raising their own prices, no such purchase would be necessary. Instead, franchisees eagerly would agree to such an arrangement,
and the two parties would allocate between themselves the resulting
supracompetitive profits.160
There is, of course, no logical connection between proof of a
prima facie case under Jefferson Parish, and the likelihood that a tying
contract implements a "raising rivals' costs" strategy. As already noted,
the pre-existence of market power, a necessary condition for liability
under the Jefferson Parish framework, is not relevant to proof that a
contract raises rivals' costs. 161 And, even if the four Jefferson Parish
factors are present, no "raising rivals costs" strategy can succeed unless
several additional conditions outlined above - substantial foreclosure
of the market for the inputs in question, barriers to entry into those markets, and inputs that account for a substantial portion of the cost of the
ultimate franchise product - are also present. Thus, a plaintiff seeking
to establish a prima facie case under such a theory would bear a much
heavier burden than plaintiffs under the Jefferson Parish framework;
157. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 66, at 240-42; see also Steven C.
Salop, Measuring Ease of Entry, 31 .ANrrrn.usT BULL. 551, 563-65 (1986) (describing
the role of a minimum viable scale as a barrier to entry).
158. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 66, at 240-42.
159. See generally id. at 223-30.
160. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mergers and Buyers, 77 VA. L. REv. 1369, 137677 (1991) (demonstrating that vertically related firms can cooperate to create and share
the resulting supracompetitive profits).
161. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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heavier, even, than advocates of a rule of reason approach to all tying
contracts usually support. 162 Finally, private plaintiffs would have to establish that they suffered antitrust injury - a difficult task, perhaps, for
franchisees who signed such an agreement hoping to share in the monopoly profits created by it - and then seek damages for supracompetitive profits lost as a result of termination of a franchise. 163
Given all the hurdles a plaintiff would have to overcome to make
out a prima facie case, it seems doubtful that such litigation would ever
reach the stage at which procompetitive benefits would be deemed relevant.164 If it did, however, proof of such benefits would not negate the
possibility that the contract produced substantial anticompetitive effects.
In fact, where franchisees cooperate in a cost-raising strategy, the presence of procompetitive benefits simply provides additional inducement
for the parties to enter into the arrangement. And, even if franchisees
would otherwise resist such a strategy, the existence of procompetitive
benefits attenuates the incentive to resist, at least when no less restrictive alternative will produce the same or similar benefits.
Although a complete consideration of the question is beyond the
scope of this article, it does not appear that, under current law, the possibility that anticompetitive effects will predominate justifies allowing a
tribunal to condemn such an arrangement because an anticompetitive
tying contract designed to raise rivals' costs is in some sense analogous
to unilateral exclusionary conduct by a monopolist. 165 Allegedly exclusionary practices that do not involve cooperation among competitors
usually are deemed anticompetitive only if they exclude rivals from the
market on a basis other than superior efficiency, 166 or are explicable
only on the hypothesis that they will lead to the acquisition of market
162. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 38-39 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (proposing a rule of reason framework for the evaluation of
tying contracts).
163. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEXAs L. REv. 1, 3839 (1984) (arguing that distributors who profit from resale price maintenance schemes
should not recover profits lost as a result of termination); see also ELZINGA & BREIT,
supra note 140, at 88-90 (describing the law regarding in pari delicto). But see Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1968) (refusing
to recognize the in pari delicto defense to distributor suit), overruled in part on other
grounds by Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
164. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 66, at 267 ("Certainly, in most industries, exclusionary rights contracts cannot be profitably employed for anticompetitive
ends.").
165. See Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 669 (7th Cir.
1985) ("Tying is not cooperation among competitors, the focus of§ 1, it is aggressive
conduct akin to monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act").
166. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605
(1985); Trans Sport, Inc. v. Starter Sportswear, Inc., 964 F.2d 186, 189-190 (2d Cir.
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power. 167 A franchise tying contract that would be negotiated by the
parties regardless of the presence of market power or the possibility of
its acquisition cannot be condemned under this standard, with the result
that the presumption advocated here should arise even in those instances when the relevant markets appear ripe for a successful anticompetitive strategy. Any other approach would likely deter procompetitive
contracts and, indeed, prevent certain frrms from adopting practices
that, by hypothesis, also will be adopted by their competitors. 168
Of course, if a frrm that otherwise appears to have adopted a costraising strategy has adopted restraints more restrictive than those actually employed by its competitors, a court should conclude that the restraints are only explicable on the hypothesis that the franchisor is attempting to obtain market power. This is not to say, however, that the
mere ability to hypothesize a less restrictive alternative should render
such a contract illegal. Antitrust policy does not prevent admitted monopolists from adopting otherwise legitimate practices simply because
those practices may solidify the monopolist's position. 169 Similarly,
franchise contracts that would be adopted absent any expectation of
market power ought not to be deemed unreasonable. 170
1992) (Marshall, J.) (holding that a practice which is supported by a legitimate business
justification cannot be deemed exclusionary).
167. See Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D. Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, 91 YALE LJ. 8 (1981).
168. See Telex Corp. v. Industrial Business Mach. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 928 (lOth
Cir. 1975) (holding that a practice adopted throughout the industry could not be deemed
monopolistic); Krattenmak:er & Salop, supra note 66, at 222 (arguing that contracts that
resulted from "competition on the merits" should not have been deemed anticompetitive even if they foreclosed rivals from the market).
169. Cf. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 116 (1986) (" '[I]t is
in the interest of competition to permit dominant firms to engage in vigorous competition ... .' ") (quoting ArthurS. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050,
1057 (6th Cir. 1984)).
170. The careful reader will wonder why a franchisee would agree to a provision
that, while procompetitive in the short run, would ultimately drive up the price of the
franchise, if a raising rivals' costs strategy were successful. '1\vo reasons come to mind.
First, even if franchisees would collectively prefer something other than a tying requirement, free riding among widely dispersed franchisees may well prevent individual franchisees from expressing these actual preferences. See Kaplow, supra note 78, at 531-36;
Krattenmak:er & Salop, supra note 66, at 268-70 (arguing that because competition is a
public good, free rider problems will prevent parties from investing sufficiently in its
preservation). Second, and perhaps most important, franchisees may assist a franchisor
in obtaining market power and thus share in its fruits. See Hovenkamp, supra note 160,
at 1380-81. Indeed, a raising rivals' costs strategy in this context involves raising the
costs of rival franchisees, the ultimate purchasers of the inputs in question. Thus,
"higher costs for the franchisor's rivals" actually translates into higher prices charged
by the franchisees' rivals and thus higher prices, revenues and profits for the franchisees
of the franchisor that has "imposed" the tying requirements contract. The franchisor, of
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B. Less Restrictive Alternatives
'lYing contracts are not the only method of controlling free riding.
One can imagine various alternative methods of policing a franchisee's
investments in quality, such as input specifications or the designation of
suppliers other than the franchisor that purportedly maintain a sufficient
level of quality. 171 Thus, one might concede that tying requirements
could be imposed through a perfectly competitive contracting process
while also relying on the presence of alternatives to assert that, in fact,
such tying requirements are anticompetitive. 172 After all, why would a
franchisee agree to such a tying requirement when alternatives are
available that present less danger that a franchisee might ultimately be
subject to a less competitive market for the tied product? 173 Under this
reasoning, the procompetitive benefits that result from the tie are in
some sense coincidental in that a franchisor has forced the franchisee to
accede to a method of achieving those benefits that is unnecessarily restrictive of competition. 174 This, of course, is the approach taken by current law: the presence of a less restrictive means of achieving the
procompetitive objectives of a presumptively illegal restraint ipso facto
requires its condemnation. 175
There is less to this argument than meets the eye. To begin with,
the adoption of tying provisions in markets that are not susceptible to
course, will share in these anticompetitive profits as it realizes higher income from
franchise fees.
171. See, e.g., Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 828
F.2d 1033, 1039-42 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding a tie-in unlawful when a "less restrictive
alternative" of specification is available); cf. Little Caesar Enters. v. Smith, 895 F.
Supp. 884, 904-905 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (finding that "forcing" is not present when a
franchisee has the option to purchase specified "tied products" elsewhere); Paul E.
Volpp Tractor Parts, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1208, 1232-35 (W.D. Tenn.
1995) (same).
172. See Turner, supra note 103, at 62. It should be noted that Turner, an early
champion of the less restrictive alternative approach is also a father of the "inhospitably" tradition of antitrust. See Wn.LIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 8,
at 19.
173. See Bowman, supra note 78, at 19-20 (arguing that an attempt to impose a tie
would fail in a perfectly competitive market). But see supra note 170 (explaining that
franchisees may desire to share in any monopoly profits created by such a scheme).
174. See Kaplow, supra note 78, at 540-52 (noting that ties may be adopted for
mixed motives). Of course, proponents of such an objection would recognize that even
when a defendant possesses market power, the adoption of such a restrictive practice is
only possible given a different sort of free riding problem among franchisees and others
who purchase the input in question. Absent such a free rider effect, franchisees would
collectively resist the imposition of the tie. Thus, these proponents would continue, the
fact that franchisees accede to such a restrictive method of controlling free riding tells
us nothing about its efficiency. See generally id. at 531-36.
175. See, e.g., Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d at 1040-42.
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anticompetitive strategies strongly suggests that less restrictive alternatives can be a suboptimal solution to the free riding problem. 176 While
efficacious in the abstract, alternatives such as product specifications
are more costly to enforce than a tying requirement. 177 In addition to
writing and publishing such specifications, finns must also monitor
compliance. 178 Such monitoring is likely to be especially costly given
the incentives of franchisees to cheat and cover up their noncompliance.179 Indeed, to the extent that an outright tie reduces the cost
of monitoring franchisee behavior, franchisors need to induce less
franchise-specific investment to deter cheating. Jso
Less restrictive alternatives are also likely to be less effective. No
franchisor can regularly inspect more than a fraction of its locations,
and such inspections are imperfect methods of detennining input qual-

176. See Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 673-74 (7th Cir.
1985) (stating that the absence of market power suggests that the practice cannot be anticompetitive); Telex Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 928
(lOth Cir. 1975) (holding that a practice employed by firms without market power cannot be monopolistic). The federal reports are replete with instances in which purported
ties were imposed by firms with no power in any relevant product market, let alone
power in a market for franchises. See, e.g., Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England,
Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 793 (1st Cir. 1988) (addressing a situation in which Subaru had a
.25% market share of the American automobile market, and the plaintiff, whose stationary read "Grappone Pontiac," had made no Subaru-speciflc investments); Will, 776
F.2d at 670-75 (franchisor obtained tie despite lack of market power); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 58-59 (2d Cir. 1980) (presenting a situation in which the plaintiff
signed a dealer agreement with full knowledge of the tie, and there was no showing that
Texaco possessed market power); cf. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 26-29 (1984) (holding that a 30% market share does not create market power).
While it is theoretically possible that such contracts could have been designed to
obtain market power via a raising rivals' costs strategy, see supra text accompanying
notes 156-70, there is no indication that any of the cases in question involved contracts
or market structures that were conducive to such a strategy. See Krattenmaker & Salop,
supra note 66, at 250-51 (listing various factors which are necessary for a cost-raising
strategy).
177. See 9 AREEDA, supra note 61, at 'J[ 1716d4; Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at
353-54; Richard S. Markovits, 1ie-Ins and Reciprocity: A Functional, Legal, And Policy
Analysis, 58 TExAs L. REv. 1363, 1382 (1980); Dugan, supra note 27, at 150.
178. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 353-54; Markovits, supra note 177, at
1382; Dugan, supra note 27, at 150.
179. See Dugan, supra note 27, at 151 (claiming that the incentive for dealers to
cheat renders policing more costly). Given these incentives, it would seem that only
surprise inspections would suffice. Under a tying contract, by contrast, the franchisor
only needs to monitor the ratio of sales, e.g., franchise fees, to input purchases. See Roy
B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379, 1381 (5th Cir. 1994) (describing how franchisor monitored the purchase of the tied product). Monitoring purchases
from other suppliers cannot serve as a substitute. Those suppliers themselves will be
subject to a free rider problem. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 353-54.
180. See Klein & Saft, supra note 10, at 352-53.
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ity. Such considerations no doubt explain findings by juries that no less
restrictive alternative would adequately protect the interest asserted. 181
The presence of less restrictive alternatives, then, says little, if anything, about whether the challenged contract is the result of "forcing."182 Regardless whether the franchisor possesses market power or
hopes to obtain it, parties will, other things being equal, adopt a tying
requirement whenever such a clause is less costly to implement which is to say, always- even when the alternative is equally effective.183 Thus, the fact that parties have chosen such a tying requirement
is as consistent with a procompetitive objective - minimizing joint
costs - as with an anticompetitive one - "forcing" or attempting to
raise the costs of rivals. 184 This analysis suggests that, whatever the efficacy of a less restrictive alternative analysis in other contexts, the law
should not, as it does now, treat the presence of a less restrictive alternative as conclusive evidence that the contract is anticompetitive. 185

181. See, e.g., Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 1342,
1348-51 (9th Cir. 1987).
182. Professor Kaplow suggests that, even when a tie is more effective than its alternatives, the presence of a less restrictive alternative still should be dispositive because the cost savings of choosing a tie are often "minuscule." He also claims that the
realization that a less restrictive alternative is more costly is of uncertain significance.
See Kaplow, supra note 78, at 543. As shown in the text, however, this realization is
quite significant, suggesting, as it does, an alternate explanation - cost-minimization
- for the employment of a tying requirement instead of a less restrictive arrangement.
Given this alternate explanation, the adoption by current law of a conclusive presumption that a tie is the result of "forcing" based solely upon (1) satisfaction of the Jefferson Parish test, and (2) the presence of a less restrictive alternative, appears unreasonable. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67
(1992) ("Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law."). This is so even when a tie is
only marginally more effective than its alternatives: even firms with market power will
seek to minimize costs, and, in the quest to do so, every little bit helps.
183. This is a necessary implication of the Cease Theorem. See Cease, supra note
91. Of course, in those cases in which a predatory counterstrategy is otherwise rational,
franchisees may choose to bear the higher costs associated with the less restrictive alternative, so long as those costs are lower than the expected harm flowing from successful
predation, discounted by the probability of such success. However, this fact does not
change the analysis in the text, which is in no way dependent on the ability of franchisees to engage in such a strategy.
184. Cf. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 596-97
(1986) (holding that summary judgment is mandated when the evidence is equally consistent with procompetitive and anticompetitive conduct); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762-64 (1984) (same).
185. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 466-67 (holding that antitrust presumptions
should rest on actual market realities). Even if the proffered alternative is as effective
and no more costly to implement than an outright tying requirement, it does not follow
that failure to adopt it establishes that the tying requirement is the result of forcing or
an attempt to obtain market power. As both options implement the legitimate objective
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C. Lock-ins
The tentative conclusion just reached assumes that a franchisor
with market power can exercise that power simply by enhancing price.
Given this option, any use of such power to impose a tying requirement
to which parties would otherwise agree squanders monopoly profits that
the franchisor could have earned, quite legally, by raising its price. 186
But what of power obtained after the franchise has been sold? Under
current law, such power can arise once the cost to the franchisee of
switching to a different franchise is significant, for instance, if the franchisee has made significant investments specific to the relationship that
cannot be recovered by selling the franchise. 187 In such cases, the
franchisor possesses significant power over the franchisee, power that
by its nature cannot be exercised by raising the franchise sale price. 188
It seems perfectly natural for a franchisor to exercise such power
by imposing a tying arrangement. 189 By threatening to terminate the relationship and requiring the franchisee to purchase inputs at a
supracompetitive price as a condition of retaining the franchise, the
franchisor can exploit its newly found "monopoly power." 190 In these
equally well, the failure to adopt the less restrictive means is as consistent with a ran•
dom selection of one over the other as it is with an attempt to exercise or obtain market
power.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 124-29.
187. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 476-77; 9 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 73, at 'li 1709.2c (1995 Supp.). Kodak also suggests that such a lock-in can occur
when the tying requirement is present from the beginning, but not recognized by the
purchaser. See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 473-76; see also Craswell, supra note 139, at 672-73
(arguing that buyers might not recognize ties at the outset, even if ties are contained in
a standard contract). This article assumes that such a strategy would not be possible in
the franchise context in light of the sophistication of potential franchisees as well as the
existence of state and federal laws mandating disclosure of such tying requirements in
writing. See supra text accompanying notes 115-19; see also William F. Baxter &
Daniel P. Kessler, Toward a Consistent Theory of the Welfare Analysis of Agreements,
47 STAN. L. REv. 615, 618 n.23 (1995); Craswell, supra note 139, at 697-98 (arguing
that the failure to disclose tying requirements terms is best addressed by consumer protection laws); Mark R. Patterson, Product Definition, Product Information, and Market
Power: Kodak in Perspective, 73 N.C. L. REv. 185, 251 (1994) (describing federal disclosure rules).
188. Cj. Moore v. Tandy Corp., 819 F.2d 820, 822 (7th Cir. 1987) (explaining how
the presence of relationship-specific investments can leave a franchisee at the mercy of
a franchisor that can terminate the relationship at will).
189. See Lande, supra note 73, at 200 & n.24.
190. See 9 AREEDA, supra note 61, at 'li 1712e. (addressing the ability of a tie to
evade private price ceiling). Of course, the franchisor need not in all circumstances
threaten to terminate the franchise outright to exploit this power. It can instead reduce
the allocation of products to the distributor or take other action that threatens the value
of the franchise. See Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 534 F. Supp. 1282,
1286-87 & n.16 (D.N.H. 1982) (addressing a situation in which the franchisor never
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circumstances, it seems, the mere presence of procompetitive benefits
does not itself suggest that the tie is the result of voluntary contractual
integration. Instead, whatever iJ:Icentives exist to create such an arrangement coexist with an incentive to use it to reap monopoly profits that
are otherwise unobtainiible, such that a rational franchisor might attempt
to eliminate free riding and charge a supracompetitive price for the tied
product. 191
In response, it should be noted that any such argument assumes
that the franchisee has failed to protect itself ex ante from those actions
- threats of termination, hold up of products, and the like - that constitute "market power" wider the regime established by Kodak. 192 The
argument also assumes that the threat of reputational losses and lost
franchise sales does not deter the franchisor from embarking on such a
strategy, 193 that "downstream competition" from competing franchise
systems does not render such a strategy unprofitable, 194 and that the
defendant has attempted to "impose" the purported tie at some point
after the franchisee has made investments specific to the franchise relationship.195 Yet, under the regime of Kodak, these arguments merely
threatened to tenninate the franchisee, but reduced the franchisee's allocation of vehicles}, revd., 858 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1988).
191. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 87-88. Such an upcharge does not, in and
of itself, pose any danger of creating power in the market for the tied product Yet,
under the rationale of Kodak, no such danger is necessary. See AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 73, at <Jl 1709.1a (1995 Supp.); Kaplow, supra note 78, at
520-25 (arguing that antitrust policy should condemn the exploitation of monopoly
power via leverage, even when there is no threat of competitive harm in the market for
the tied product).
192. See Lande, supra note 73, at 200 ("Absent imperfect information this rent
extraction would not be a concern, for no franchisee would sign a franchise arrangement that would enable the franchisor unfairly to extract its goodwill.''). In this vein,
one scholar argues that the very absence of contractual protection against such opportunism suggests that purchasers have determined that such protection is unnecessary, with
the result that no "lock-in" is present. See Klein, supra note 72, at 50-52.
193. See George A. Hay, Is the Glass Half-Empty or Half-Full?: Reflections on
the Kodak Case, 62 ANTrrR.UST LJ. 177, 188-89 (1993).
194. See id. at 187; 9 AREEoA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 73, at <JI 1709c2.
Thus, if the downstream market is highly competitive and the strategy increases the
price of a significant input, consumers will substitute away from the franchise's products, reducing any franchise fees earned by the franchisor and rendering the scheme unprofitable. See International Telephone & Telegraph Co., 104 FI'C 280, 410-11 (1984)
(including "downstream competition" in the relevant market); AREEDA &
HoVENKAMP, supra note 73, at <JI 520lb1 (1996 Supp.); HoRIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at § 1.11(3); cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
148 F.2d 416, 424-25 (2d Cir. 1945) (including within the relevant market both virgin
ingot and ingot fabricated for sale downstream).
195. See Lee v. Life Ins. Co. ofN. Am., 23 F.3d 14, 20 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding no
lock-in where plaintiffs knew of the challenged policy before making asset-specific investments); Kenosha Liquor Co. v. Heublein, Inc., 895 F.2d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 1990)
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raise questions of fact to be addressed by the tribunal in determining
whether the franchisor possesses power over the tying product as a result of a lock-in. 196 Thus, any attempt to "filter" good ties from bad ties
by focusing solely on procompetitive effects appears inconsistent with
the current legal landscape, which requires courts in some cases to assume that these effects coexist with the exercise of market power and to
engage in the required balancing analysis.
Closer scrutiny, however, suggests the existence of another condition that is necessary to evade the prima facie legality standard proposed here. To this point, we have assumed that a franchisor's exercise
of market power can only take the form of reducing the output of
franchises, with the result that there can be no exercise of market power
- aside from tying - once those awards have been made. Yet, even
after franchises are awarded, there exists a separate outlet for a firm's
market power: namely, an increase in the price of products sold to the
franchisee. Thus, if an automobile dealer has made investments specific
to the dealership that lock the dealer into the relationship, the manufacturer may exercise its power simply by increasing the price of automobiles sold to the dealer. 197 When this option is present, the incentive to
employ a tie for the purpose of exercising market power becomes more
ambiguous, and we are drawn back to the general conclusion offered
here - that any use of market power to impose such a tie would be an
irrational waste of that power such that. the presence of procompetitive
benefits suggests that the arrangement is prima facie legal. 19s
Yet, even if a tie is the only method through which a franchisor
could exercise market power conferred by a lock-in, the existence of
procompetitive benefits still should render a tie prima facie lawful. Here
it is important to distinguish between two possible sources of anticompetitive harm: the tying requirement itself, which forecloses the franchisee from purchasing the tied product elsewhere, and any upcharge on
the tied product. Where a franchisor in such a position could obtain
(fmding that the manufacturer need not terminate a distributor to exploit the value of
the former's brand when it can raise the price of the primacy product). Of course, when
a franchisor can terminate a franchise at will, it can effectively raise franchise fees at
any time.
196. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 47179 (1992). But cf. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Technologies, Inc., 73 F.3d 756,
762 (7th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that Kodak assumed, rather than decided, this question).
197. See Hay, supra note 193, at 185-87 (describing a hypothetical scheme
whereby a fast food franchisee exploits locked-in franchisees by charging monopoly
meat prices).
198. Cf. Kenosha Liquor, 895 F.2d at 420 (granting summary judgment for the
manufacturer when the plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer had acted irrationally by
exploiting the allure of the brand name via termination).
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such an agreement through voluntary negotiation, it would not use any
market power to impose the tie itself but instead only to enhance the
price of the tied product. Thus, the existence of procompetitive benefits
suggests that the tying requirement itself is not the result of forcing.
Even when a lock-in confers market power, then, the presence of
procompetitive effects should render the tying requirement prima facie
legal, subject, of course, to the plaintiff's ability to prove an actual
upcharge. 199
D. Price Discrimination
The analysis offered here assumes that_franchisors that wish to exercise whatever market power they possess can do so simply by raising
the price of the franchise.200 This assumption may not always describe
entirely a franchisor's options, however. When different franchisees
value the franchise opportunity differently, merely raising the price
across the board will not capture the full profit available to a franchisor
with market power.201 In these circumstances, a franchisor can only realize the full potential of its power by discriminating in price among various purchasers.202
This realization is not itself an objection to the analysis offered
here. A franchisor with information about the demand elasticities of potential franchisees simply could vary the prices charged to different
franchisees accordingly.203 Thus the realization simply suggests that the
approach offered here depends on the assumption that franchisors possess sufficient information about various franchisees to engage in price
discrimination. Absent such information, the assumption that a
franchisor necessarily would prefer to exercise whatever market power
it possesses by increasing price collapses. Such a collapse leaves one to
suspect that, at least in some circumstances, tying requirements that
produce procompetitive benefits are in fact utilized by franchisors as

199. See supra text accompanying notes 142-43.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 124-34. Such an increase could take the
form of higher up-front prices, franchise fees, or both.
201. See HoVENKAMP, supra note 126, at 342 ("Even the monopolist charging its
nondiscriminatory profit-maximizing price does not make all the money theoretically
possible from its position.").
202. See id. at 341-42; see also M.L. Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55
Nw. U. L. REv. 62 (1960).
203. See JEAN TlROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 142-43
(1988).
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devices for price discrimination.204 This conclusion, in tum, suggests a
return to a sort of balancing test whereby the burdens of price discrimination are balanced against the benefits of eliminating free riding.zos
Ultimately, however, the realization that imperfect infonnation
may lead a franchisor in some instances to utilize tying contracts to
price discriminate does not require an approach different from that offered here.206 Such a strategy is only possible when purchases of the
tied product are a strong indicator of a franchisee's elasticity of demand
for the franchise opportunity, an elasticity that many assume is highly
correlated with a franchisee's sale of the franchise product generally.207
Many franchise tying cases, however, involve instances in which the
franchisee's purchases of the tied product are poorly correlated with its
total revenues.208 Moreover, even when purchases of the tied product
correspond with total sales, there is little guarantee that sales are a
strong proxy for elasticity. Instead, such elasticity will more likely depend upon the competition to be faced by the franchisee in its territory,
as well as the availability of substitute franchise opportunities.209
204. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 126, at 229-33 (discussing the conditions
under which franchisors may use tying arrangements as vehicles for price
discrimination).
205. See Wn.LIAMSON, EcONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 373 n.14
(describing such an analysis).
206. Of course, the most potent response to such an objection may be to argue that
price discrimination is itself of no concern of the Sherman Act absent some independent
showing of anticompetitive effect. See Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act, 15
U.S.C. § 13 (1994) (prohibiting price discrimination that lessens competition).
207. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 126, at 229-33; Burstein, supra note 202, at
72.
208. See, e.g., Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 79396 (1st Cir. 1988) (addressing a tying requirement that the franchisee maintain an adequate supply of replacement parts); Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833
F.2d 1342, 1348-51 (9th Cir. 1987) (addressing a tying requirement that the dealer utilize Mercedes or Mercedes-approved replacement parts); Southern Pines Chrysler-Plymouth v. Chrysler Corp., 826 F.2d 1360, 1362-63 (4th Cir. 1987) (addressing a tying requirement that the franchisee purchase automobiles that sold poorly); Paul E. Volpp
Tractor Parts, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1208, 1212-14 (W.D. Tenn. 1995)
(addressing a tying requirement that the franchisee purchase replacement parts only
from the franchisor). Also, when the franchise is of the "source" variety - when the
franchisee purchases the franchise product from the franchisor - sales of the tied product are often directly proportional to sales of that main product, such that sales of the
tied product are no better as a proxy for elasticity than sales of the main product itself.
See, e.g., Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc., v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468,
472-73 (3rd Cir. 1992) (addressing a tying requirement that Chrysler's franchisees
purchase sound systems from it).
209. Professor Hovenkamp, who views franchise tying contracts as presumptive
vehicles for price discrimination, see HoVENKAMP, supra note 126, at 229-33, notes in
a different context that "[t]here are no two identical firms in two different cities. Even
two McDonald's franchises in identical buildings and traffic areas, and with equally ca-
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At any rate, franchisors overcome such informational barriers by
methods of price discrimination other than tying contracts. Imposition
of a franchise fee, for instance, would seem to be an excellent vehicle
for price discrimination; those franchisees with large revenues will ultimately pay more for the franchise than those who do poorly.210 The
availability of a less cumbersome method of price discrimination suggests that (1) tying requirements often accomplish something different
- that is to say, beneficial- from price discrimination, and (2) the
elimination of price discrimination by prohibiting franchise tying contracts is largely a quixotic endeavor, the pursuit of which does not justify a departure from the general approach offered here. Indeed, when
tying is the best method of price discrimination, prohibiting it will simply lead firms to adopt less· effective measures, measures that may well
lead to even lower output and larger allocative losses, as franchisors incur additional transaction costs in their quest to determine the demand
elasticities of various franchisees. 211 Antitrust policy would not be well
served by such a result.212 Requiring franchisees actually to prove price
discrimination by showing an unjustified upcharge on the tied product
will vindicate whatever consumer interest is served by prohibiting tying
as a means of price discrimination.
·

pable management, can show widely different rates of profitability." Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1, 39 (1989). Both propositions, it seems, cannot be correct.
210. See Burstein, supra note 202, at 73-74 (arguing that a franchise fee is an "ancillary condition" that facilitates price discrimination); Kaplow, supra note 78, at 54042 (claiming that the presence of alternative methods of price discrimination suggests
that a tie is not a vehicle for such discrimination); Kaufmann & LaFontaine, supra note
28, at 438 ("rrlhere are fairly costless mechanisms that McDonald's could use to extract more rents from higher volume or promising restaurants."). Indeed, to the extent
that a franchisee's revenues are a better proxy for its demand elasticity than are its
purchases of the tied product, such a method of discrimination will be superior to a tying arrangement. Cf. Burstein, supra note 202, at 72 (arguing that the success of a tying
scheme as a vehicle for price discrimination depends upon "the assumption that sales of
the [tied product] will be highly correlated with sales of the [tying product] over time").
211. See OUVER E. Wn.UAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS
AND ANTrrn.usT IMPUCATIONS 11-13 (1975) (noting that monopolists are willing to
incur transaction costs to realize .the benefits of price discrimination); see also Basil
Yamey, Monopolistic Price Discrimination and Economic Welfare, 17 J.L. & EcoN.
377 (1974).
212. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp, 485 U.S. 717, 730 n.3 (1988) (refusing to
adopt a per se rule because such a rule will lead parties to engage in inefficient practices as a means of evasion); see also Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 56 n.25 (1977) (rejecting a rule that will simply lead firms to accomplish anticompetitive objectives in other, more costly, ways).
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E. Recalcitrant Franchisees
Of course, few franchisees challenge tying requirements at their inception - it is difficult to locate cases in which franchisees seek declaratory judgments that the contracts they are about to enter are illegal.
Instead, most such challenges surface later, either in the midst of therelationship or in response to termination of the franchise. 213 One might
ask: if franchise tying contracts are so beneficial to franchisees, why are
they so often subject to challenge? Does not the presence of so many
lawsuits challenging restrictions support the theory, outlined in Standard Oil, that such contracts are "forced" on franchisees?
This objection appears ill-founded in light of the economic characteristics of the franchise relationship, characteristics that suggest that
such suits are often a symptom of free riding. By creating a strong reputation for quality associated with the franchise trademark, the enforcement of a tying requirement makes free riding all the more remunerative.214 It should be no surprise then that some franchisees will attempt
to "have their cake and eat it too" - pay a lower price for the
franchise opportunity and free ride on other franchisees. 215 Of course,
contractual remedies for such shirking are likely to be ineffective,216
with the result that franchisors can only resort to self-help, namely, the
termination of a franchise or the threat to do so, to obtain compliance
with the tying requirement.217 Termination may deprive the franchisee

'

213. See Roy B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Hollymatic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379, 1382 (5th
Cir. 1994) (addressing a claim filed after the tennination of the franchise challenging
certain tying tenns contained in the initial agreement); cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 779
(1995); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 49-50 (2d Cir. 1980) (same); Siegel v.
Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 46 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1971) (evaluating tying requirements in place for nearly two decades before the suit). But cf. Little Caesar Enters. v.
Smith, 895 F. Supp. 884, 894-95 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (addressing a tying requirement allegedly imposed after the award of the franchise); Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 534 F. Supp. at 1286-87 (D.N.H. 1982) (same), revd., 858 F.2d 792 (1st Cir.
1988).
214. See Easterbrook, supra note 163, at 38-39 (discussing incentives for dealers
to cheat on resale price maintenance schemes); Muris, supra note 34, at 575-80; supra
text accompanying notes 29-44 (discussing franchisees' general incentives to shirk).
215. See Wn..LIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 8, at 371 (observing that the desire to "have your cake (low price) and eat it too (no restrictions)" is inconsistent with "the theory and the practice of contract"); see also supra text accompanying notes 99-100 (noting that franchisees pay a lower price for franchise opportunity
by promising not to free ride).
216. See Muris, supra note 34, at 575.
217. See Kaufmann & LaFontaine, supra note 28 (concluding that McDonald's
leaves rents downstream for franchisees to create a "penalty" for tennination); Klein,
supra note 95, at 358-59 (claiming that the threat of tennination of franchisees and the
resulting loss of specific investment constitute a "perfonnance bond" paid by the franchisee to assure quality); Richard L. Smith II, Franchise Regulation: An Economic
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of franchise-specific investments or economic rents, thereby motivating
a lawsuit seeking lucrative treble damages.218
As a theoretical matter, such damages should be nonexistent in
those cases where the challenged arrangement is efficient - where
there is no upcharge on the tied product.219 Yet, to the extent that courts
award damages - as they often do - reflecting the lost value of the
franchise opportunity itself, no such upcharge must be proven.220 Even
when no such franchise-specific investments are present, a franchisee
still may bring suit, insofar as the remedy for termination is not limited
to the economic rents lost as a result of termination, but in some circumstances may include injunctive relief as well.221 The threat to seek
such an injunction - to impose significant externalities on the
franchise system - may allow a plaintiff to obtain a lucrative settlement. Thus, current law against tying, combined with the possibility of
treble damages, provides a mechanism whereby franchisees can obtain a
franchise for a lower price by promising not to free ride, all the while
planning to do so, knowing full well that, if caught, they will have the
"insurance policy" of a treble damage action.222 The presence of so
many suits simply suggests that franchisees are acting opportunistically,

Analysis of State Restrictions on Automobile Distribution, 25 J.L. & EcoN. 125, 129
(1982) (same).
218. See Jack Kahn Music Co. v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 604 F.2d 755, 757
(2d Cir. 1979) (discussing the propensity of terminated distributors to file treble damage
actions).
219. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 52-53 (9th Cir. 1971); see
also Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977) (limiting treble
damage remedies to those injuries that flow from anticompetitive conduct).
220. See Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 59 n.19 (2d Cir. 1980) (describing a
method of calculating damages based on termination); Hovenkamp, supra note 209, at
5; see also supra text accompanying notes 148-49; cf. Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807
F.2d 520, 556-560 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that normal profits were not available given
the duty to mitigate damages).
221. See, e.g., Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir.
1970) (Friendly, J.) (observing that equitable relief is available when the plaintiff had a
contractual expectation to remain a distributor).
222. See ELZINGA & BREIT, supra note 140, at 84-90. Indeed, some scholars
have gone so far as to suggest that the existence of treble damages provides dealers
with the incentive to breach their contracts purposely in the hope of being terminated.
See WILLIAM BREIT & KENNETH G. El.ZINGA, ANrrrR.usT PENALTY REFORM 3638 (1986); Henry N. Butler, Restricted Distribution Contracts and the Opportunistic
Pursuit of Treble Damages, 59 WASH. L. REv. 27 (1983). But cf. Robert H. Lande, Are
Antitrust "Treble" Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 Omo ST. LJ. 115 (1993) (arguing that treble damages do not overcompensate plaintiffs). Similarly, one could argue
that present tying law presents distributors with the lucrative option of benefiting from a
tying arrangement for several years only to challenge it thereafter, reaping treble damages or an injunction.
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and tells us nothing about the efficacy or origin of franchise tying
contracts.

F. Bypassing the Coercion Element?
At bottom, this article concludes that ties that produce substantial
procompetitive benefits which are internalized by the parties are most
probably not forced on franchises through the exercise of market power,
but instead are examples of voluntary contractual integration about
which the antitrust laws should not be concerned. This suggestion that
"voluntariness"- however determined- ought to save an otherwise
per se illegal tie may ring hollow to the practitioner familiar with the
formal elements of tying analysis, specifically, the tying requirement
that "conditioning," which generally includes "coercion" or "forcing,"
be present.223 Does the present proposal add to the coercion analysis already required, or is it a call for a second bite at the coercion apple?
The proposal offered here would constitute a second bite if, in fact,
the current law governing the conditioning element and the subsidiary
inquiry into coercion reflected a rational method of sorting "coercive"
ties from those that are "voluntary" in the sense employed here. Present law generally makes no such attempt. A few courts do not even require a showing of coercion.224 Moreover, in some other courts, a fmding of coercion can be based simply on a showing that a form contract
contained the tying requirement, and that there was no chance for negotiation over the provision.225 As one court recently held in the franchise
context
Where the tying arrangement is admitted or . , . imposed as part of a
contract, there is no further need to demonstrate the forcing element. Because of the very nature of a binding contract, coercion and forcing can
be implied since the victim of the tying arrangement has no other choice

223. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16-18 (1984) (defining a per se violation with reference to the possibility of "forcing"); Paul E. Volpp
Tractor Parts, Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1208, 1231-32 (W.D. Tenn. 1995);
Little Caesar Enters. v. Smith, 895 F. Supp. 884, 895 (B.D. Mich. 1995) (noting that
"forcing" is a necessary element of a franchise tying claim).
224. See Bell v. Cherokee Aviation Corp., 660 F.2d 1123, 1130-32 (6th Cir. 1981);
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 450 (3d Cir. 1977).
225. See, e.g., Tic-X-Press, Inc. v. Omni Promotions, Co., 815 F.2d 1407, 1416-17
(lith Cir. 1987), modified by Thomson v. Metropolitan Multi List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566
(11th Cir. 1991); Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1506,
1517 (N.D. Cal. 1984), affd., 833 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1987). Contra Capital Temporaries, Inc. v. Olsten Corp., 506 F.2d 658, 666 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that the mere fact
that a franchisee signed a standard franchise contract does not establish coercion).
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but to comply with the arrangement or face litigation to enforce the
contract.226

Indeed, in some courts, a showing that an appreciable number of buyers
accepted a "burdensome" term establishes by itSelf the element of coercion.227 Finally, at least one court has held that threatening to terminate a dealer for failure to abide by a tying tying requirement in the
original contract is sufficient to establish coercion.228
Obviously, the present tests governing "coercion" or "conditioning" are not up to the task of distinguishing procompetitive ties from
those that are anticompetitive on the grounds offered here. The mere
fact that a provision appears "burdensome" after the contract has been
entered does not require the conclusion that the provision has been "imposed" at all.229 Instead, the franchisee simply may have accepted the
term in return for a different, favorable term or a lower price.230 Moreover, courts that deem the mere presence of a condition in a binding contract to be "coercive" confuse the process of contract enforcementwhich necessarily involves public or private coercion - with that of
contract formation.231 The test offered here avoids this confusion and allows courts to sort agreements that have been "imposed" from those
that are freely bargained for.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OUTSIDE THE FRANCHISE CONTEXT

The analysis offered here has significant possible application in
other contexts, where the presence of low transaction costs suggests that
226. Little Caesar, 895 F. Supp. at 896; see also Volpp Tractor, 917 F. Supp. at
1232; Anderson Foreign Motors, Inc. v. New England Toyota Dist, Inc., 475 F. Supp.
973, 979-88 (D. Mass. 1979).
227. See Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1217 (9th Cir. 1977);
Hill v. A-T-0 Inc., 535 F.2d 1349, 1355 (2d Cir. 1976).
228. See Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832, 839-41 (4th Cir. 1960).
229. Cf. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (stating that a court
may refuse to enforce a contractual term that is unconscionable "at the time the contract is made") (emphasis added).
230. As Professor Williamson explains:
It is easy to conclude, upon examining a contract at a point in time, that one of
the parties to the exchange is disadvantaged by the restraint .••.
Such a myopic conception fails to recognize that the terms under which the
original franchise was struck reflect the associated restraints. It is understandably
attractive to have your cake (low price) and eat it too (no restrictions). But both
the theory and the practice of contract preclude that.
Wn.LIAMSON, EcoNOMIC INSTITliTIONS, supra note 8, at 371; see also supra text accompanying notes 98-100 (explaining that franchisees will not be willing to pay a sufficiently high price for the right to choose inputs).
231. See, e.g., Little Caesar Enters. v. Smith, 895 F. Supp. 884, 896 (E.D. Mich.
1995).-
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a partial equilibrium tradeoff analysis is inappropriate. Consider the socalled ~'false attribution" justification for tying contracts. Here, the
seller asserts that it must require the purchaser to take from it a complement of the tying product to ensure that use of a lower quality complement does not cause the tying product to break down, improperly undermining its reputation.232 Under current law, courts assume that such a
tying requirement, while possibly beneficial, must be forced on an unwilling purchaser by means of the exercise of market power.233 The
analysis offered here, however, suggests that the seller, who internalizes
the benefits of eliminating the "false attribution" problem, will charge
a lower price to those customers who accept the tying requirement and
a higher price to those who do not.234 Such price differentials, of course,
are cost-justified and thus unrelated to the exercise of market power,
suggesting that, when a tying requirement does eliminate a "false attribution" problem, no forcing is present, even when a less restrictive alternative is available.
A recent decision involving a horizontal restraint provides another
possible application of the analysis offered here. In United States v.
Brown University, 235 MIT argued, inter alia, that an agreement limiting
competition between it and other elite colleges and universities with respect to fmancial aid awards to non-needy students was necessary to
improve the quality of education at the respective schools, by diverting
the increased profits associated with reduced competition to scholarships for students of diverse socio-economic backgrounds.236 The Third
Circuit held that a rule of reason balancing test was appropriate - that
the fact fmder should balance the benefits of an improved education
against the harms resulting from the limitation on competition imposed
by the challenged agreement.237 Such an approach, of course, constituted a classic partial equilibrium welfare analysis: the fact fmder was
required to compare the harm flowing from the exercise of market

232. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 48384 (1992). The classic example is ffiM's tying requirement that customers purchase
from it "punch cards" for use in its tabulating machines, purportedly to insure that use
of inferior cards did not cause the machines to malfunction. See mM v. United States,
298 U.S. 131, 138-40 (1936); see also International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S.
392, 397-98 (1947); United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Penn.
1960}, affd., 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (per curiam).
233. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949).
234. See supra text accompanying notes 98-104.
235. 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
236. See 5 F.3d at 674.
237. See 5 F.3d at 676-79.
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power with the benefit associated with the enhanced demand for the
schools' respective products.
Here again, the transaction cost approach has powerful implications. If, in fact, the benefit of enhancing socio-economic diversity at a
college or university improves the quality of the education, and thus
outweighs the resulting harm to other students, we would expect that a
school could, absent transaction costs, unilaterally adopt policies enhancing such diversity and, as a result, realize a higher demand for its
services. More precisely, a school could differentiate its product from
others and thus command a higher price in the form of less attractive
scholarship awards to non-needy students. In such circumstances, a
"less restrictive alternative" - no restraint at all - would be called
for, insofar as each institution could achieve the very same procompetitive objective without acting collectively. Thus, litigation resources currently spent balancing one effect against another would be better employed determining the magnitude of transaction costs attending the
relationship between schools and prospective students.
Finally, it should be noted that the approach offered here has implications for the scope of available remedies to redress restraints that
the law otherwise might deem unreasonable. It is well settled that private plaintiffs may obtain legal or equitable relief only upon proof of
"antitrust injury"- when the alleged injury flows from the aspect of a
restraint or practice that renders it unlawful and is the type of injury
that the antitrust laws seek to prevent.238 The analysis advanced here
suggests that many of the injuries alleged by private plaintiffs - for instance, foreclosure from competing in the market as the result of an exclusive dealing or tying contract239 - might not be related to any exercise of market power, but might instead be the natural result of
contractual integration that produces procompetitive benefits. Thus,
even where a contract might be, on balance, anticompetitive, a plaintiff
would not suffer antitrust injury when the presence of significant
procompetitive effects suggests that the parties would have entered the
very same contract absent any prospect of obtaining or exercising mar-

238. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990);
Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc. 479 U.S. 104, 109-13 (1986).
239. See, e.g., Town Sound and Custom Tops, Inc., v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959
F.2d 468, 481-85 (3rd Cir. 1992) (en bane) (addressing the claim that foreclosure resulted from a tying contract); Interface Group v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9,
11-12 (1st Cir. 1987) (addressing the allegation that foreclosure from the market resulted from an exclusive dealing contract).
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ket power. In these circumstances, challenges to such contracts would
be left to public agencies, or, perhaps, consumers.240
CONCLUSION

Economists have demonstrated that franchise tying contracts can
reduce free riding by franchisees and thus increase output. The partial
equilibrium tradeoff framework that governs the analysis of tying arrangements and trade restraints, however, is premised upon the presence
of high transaction costs. Under this approach, any beneficial effects of
a challenged restraint must be weighed against anticompetitive effects
that are presumed once the plaintiff proves the elements of a per se violation. Moreover, as in other antitrust contexts, the presence of a less restrictive means of achieving the tie's objectives is fatal to the arrangement regardless whether it is on balance procompetitive.
This article has demonstrated that the balancing framework so
thoroughly developed and rigorously applied in a variety of antitrust
contexts is simply ill-suited to the evaluation of tying contracts that reduce the agency costs associated with the separation of the ownership
of a trademark from its control - a separation inherent in the franchise
system. In particular, once the plaintiff makes a showing of market
power, the ordinary framework assumes that any procompetitive benefits associated with the reduction in agency costs are "forced" on franchisees and thus necessarily coexist with anticompetitive effects. As
shown here, however, this assumption is ill-founded in the tying context, where transaction costs are very low. Instead, in such cases, parties
are in a position to order their relationship voluntarily in a manner that
produces procompetitive benefits internalized by each. The presence of
such benefits strongly suggests that the defendant need not exercise
market power to achieve them - that no "forcing" is present.
Insofar as the exercise of market power involves the sacrifice of
monopoly profits, the presence of such benefits strongly suggests that
the franchisor would not "impose" a tying contract through the exercise of market power, but would negotiate for the voluntary inclusion of
such a provision. Thus, the existence of such benefits requires a conclusion that the arrangement is prima facie unrelated to the exercise of
market power or any hope of obtaining it, with the result that the ar240. Cf. Alberta Gas Chems. Ltd. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 826 F.2d
1235, 1246 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding no antitrust injury when the same hann would have
occurred in the absence of an anticompetitive effect); Bayou Bottling, Inc. v. Dr. Pepper
Co., 725 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1984) (same); see also Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 487-88 (1977) (observing that antitrust laws are not designed
to remedy those harms that result from procompetitive practices).
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rangement should be presumed legal, regardless of whether a less restrictive alternative is available. ·
This is not to say that any arrangement that produces procompetitive benefits should be deemed per se legal: the test proposed here
would still allow a plaintiff to show that a tying contract is unreasonable by proving that there is an unjustified "upcharge" on the tied product. However, once the defendant has shown that the challenged contract creates substantial procompetitive benefits, such proof must
proceed without the benefit of either the presumption that arises upon
the proof of market power or the "less restrictive alternative" test.
Finally, the implications of this approach apply beyond the
franchise tying context to other situations in. which the parties enjoy
low transaction costs. In these circumstances a partial equilibrium ·tradeoff analysis is simply inappropriate. The test that is normally applied,
and the standards governing the available remedies for unreasonable restraints, must be adjusted accordingly.

